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HOW LONG IS TOO LONG? WHEN PRETRIAL
DETENTION VIOLATES DUE PROCESS
FLORALYNN EINESMAN*
From the passage of the Judiciary Act of 1789 to the present ...
federal law has unequivocally provided that a person arrested for
a non-capital offense shall be admitted to bail. This traditional.
right to freedom before conviction permits the unhampered prep-
aration of a defense, and serves to prevent the infliction of pun-
ishment prior to conviction . . . .Unless this right to bail before
trial is preserved, the presumption of innocence, secured only after
centuries of struggle, would lose its meaning.'
In 1984, Congress passed the Bail Reform Act (the Act) 2 which
revolutionized the way in which bail was determined in federal
criminal cases. For the first time in the history of federal bail
legislation, courts are authorized, in noncapital cases, to consider
both the defendant's risk of flight, as well his possible danger to
the community, when deciding whether and what amount of bail
should be set in a federal criminal case.3 The Act permits the court
to incarcerate, without bail, a presumptively innocent individual
charged with a federal offense when no conditions of release would
"reasonably assure" the defendant's appearance at trial or "the
safety of any other person and the community." ' 4
Seeking to address the serious issues of flight and criminal activity
by those released on bail, Congress created new problems when it
passed this Act. While authorizing the pretrial detention of a defen-
dant, Congress included no provision in the Act that limits the
length of time a defendant could spend in pretrial detention. Con-
gress mistakenly relied on the Speedy Trial Act5 to restrict the period
of confinement to ninety days. 6 Because the Speedy Trial Act con-
* Associate Professor, California Western School of Law. J.D. 1980, Boston
University; B.A. 1977, McGill University. I am grateful to Michal Belknap, Lisa Black,
Christine Hickman, Marilyn Ireland, Sheldon Krantz, Linda Morton, Jan Stiglitz and
Daniel Yeager for their comments on earlier drafts of this Article and to Suzanne
Brown, Ian Kipnes, Sandy Murray, Kim Page, Whitney Ryan, Michael von Loewenfeldt,
Allen Weinberg and Linda Weathers for their diligent efforts and assistance.
1. Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1, 4 (1951) (citations omitted).
2. 18 U.S.C. §§ 3141-3156 (1988 & Supp. II 1990).
3. 18 U.S.C. § 3142(g).
4. 18 U.S.C. § 3142(e).
5. 18 U.S.C. §§ 3161-3174 (1988 & Supp. 11 1990).
6. For a discussion of Congress' decision to rely on the Speedy Trial Act to
limit the length of pretrial detention, see infra notes 95-108 and accompanying text.
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tains eighteen exclusions from its time limits, it does not effectively
restrict the period of pretrial detention. This error was aggravated
when the Supreme Court, reviewing the constitutionality of the Act,
failed to address the question of when pretrial confinement exceeds
the limits of due process.7 Due to the failure of Congress and the
Supreme Court to resolve this problem, defendants facing federal
criminal charges have been incarcerated without bail for as long as
thirty-two months.'
After setting forth the background and history of the Act, this
Article will address the question of how long an accused may be
confined pretrial, without bail, before a violation of substantive duie
process takes place. Since neither Congress nor the Supreme Court
has restricted the length of pretrial detention, the lower courts have
devised their own standards to determine when a period of such
incarceration crosses the line from permissible regulation to imper-
missible punishment. After tracing the evolution of these tests, this
Article will analyze how they lead to protracted periods of incarcer-
ation for presumptively innocent individuals. 9 This Article will then
propose changes to the legislation to ensure that the law comports
with due process.
Part I will discuss the history and practice of the Bail Reform
Act of 1984. Part II will analyze the case of United States v.
Salerno,10 the first and, thus far, only case in which the United
States Supreme Court has reviewed the constitutionality of the Act.
Although the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the Act
against a facial challenge, the Court chose not to resolve the question
that this article will address-when does pretrial detention become
so protracted so as to violate due process." Part III will examine
the development of the due process tests used to determine whether
the pretrial detention has become punitive. It will conclude that the
tests are deficient because they fail to effectively protect the liberty
interest of the accused. Part IV will propose changes to the Act in
an effort to reconcile the issue of pretrial detention to the Due
Process Clause of the United States Constitution. 12
7. United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 747 n.4 (1987) ("We intimate no
view as to the point at which detention in a particular case might become excessively
prolonged, and therefore, punitive, in relation to Congress' regulatory goal.").
8. United States v. Ojeda Rios, 846 F.2d 167 (2d Cir. 1988).
9. Even if a criminal defendant is ultimately convicted of the charged offense,
he is still entitled to due process under the Fifth Amendment before this adjudication.
Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535 (1979) ("For under the Due Process Clause, a
detainee may not be punished prior to an adjudication of guilt in accordance with due
process of law."); United States v. Gallo, 653 F. Supp. 320, 343 (E.D.N.Y. 1986)
("That a defendant is ultimately found guilty does not, of course, excuse the violation
of his constitutional rights prior to conviction.")
10. 481 U.S. 739 (1987).
11. Salerno, 481 U.S. at 747 n.4; see supra note 7.
12. This Article does not seek to critique the entire Bail Reform Act of 1984
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I. THE FEDERAL BAIL REFORM ACT OF 1984
In 1984, through sweeping legislation, Congress dramatically
altered the way in which the matter of bail was determined in federal
criminal cases. 3 Congress adopted these changes to reflect its deter-
mination that a new bail law should address the problem of criminal
activity by those released on bail and to authorize courts to consider
the issue of danger to others that a defendant may pose if released
on bail. 14 In passing this legislation, Congress noted that these
changes marked a "significant departure from the basic philosophy
of the Bail Reform Act [of 1966] which is that the sole purpose of
bail laws must be to assure the appearance of the defendant at
judicial proceedings."' 5
A. The Bail Reform Act of 1966
The new legislation revised the Bail Reform Act of 1966,16 which
had been the first major modification of the federal bail system
since 1789.11 President Johnson signed the 1966 Act into law on
June 22, 1966.18 It sought to address the inequities of the Federal
Judiciary Act of 1789,19 which resulted in indigent defendants being
held in pretrial custody due to their financial inability to post a
or the decision in United States v. Salerno. For a critique of the Bail Reform Act, see
Albert W. Alschuler, Preventive Pretrial Detention and the Failure of Interest-Balancing
Approaches to Due Process, 85 MICH. L. REv. 510 (1986); Kevin F. Arthur, Comment,
Preventive Detention: Liberty in the Balance, 46 MD. L. REV. 378 (1987); Scott D.
Himsell, Comment, Preventive Detention: A Constitutional But Ineffective Means of
Fighting Pretrial Crime, 77 J. Cimw. L. & CRDuNOLOGY 439 (1986); Shari J. Cohen,
Note, Circumventing Due Process: A Judicial Response to Criminal Recidivism Under
the Bail Reform Act, 15 HASTINGS Co NsT. L.Q. 319 (1988); and John A. Washington,
Note, Preventive Detention: Dangerous Until Proven Innocent, 38 CATh. U. L. REV.
271 (1988). For a discussion of the Salerno decision, see Michael J. Eason, Note,
Eighth Amendment-Pretrial Detention: What Will Become of the Innocent? 78 J.
CRm. L. & CR.uNoLoGY, 1048 (1988); John B. Howard, Note, The Trial of Pretrial
Dangerousness: Preventive Detention After United States v. Salerno, 75 VA. L. REV.
639 (1989); and Marian E. Lupo, Comment, United States v. Salerno: A Loaded
Weapon Ready for the Hand, 54 BROOK. L. REV. 171 (1988).
13. 18 U.S.C. §§ 3141-3156 (1988 & Supp. II 1990) (current version at 18
U.S.C. §§ 3141-3156 (1988 & Supp. 11 1990)).
14. S. REP. No. 225, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1983), reprinted in 1984
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 3185.
15. Id. at 3185-86.
16. Bail Reform Act of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-465, 80 Stat. 214 (1966) reprinted
in 1966 U.S.C.C.A.N. 241 (codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 3141-3151 (1982)).
17. Sam J. Ervin, Jr., The Legislative Role in Bail Reform, 35 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 429, 431 (1967) [hereinafter Legislative Role].
18. Id. at 429.
19. See Ervin, Legislative Role, supra note 17, at 444 n.38.
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surety bond. 20 Before 1966, the federal courts generally set bail in
the amount of a corporate surety bond. This procedure required the
defendant to resort to a bail bondsman to gain his release from
pretrial custody.2' In so doing, the defendant was obliged to pay the
bondsman a nonrefundable fee, usually ten percent of the bail set. 22
The defendant also was required to post collateral with the bail
bondsman in an effort to secure his release. 23 Consequently, many
poor defendants, without property and money to post, were unable
to secure even a low surety bond. As a result, these defendants were
incarcerated before trial on the basis of their indigence rather than
their likelihood of flight. 24
The Bail Reform Act of 1966 sought to eliminate financial status
from bail consideration. 25 The Act provided that each defendant was
presumptively entitled to release on the preferred method of release-
personal recognizance or the execution of an unsecured appearance
bond in an amount specified by the court. 2 Such methods of release
did not oblige the defendant to resort to a bail bondsman or post
any property as collateral. 27 The Act also enumerated various alter-
natives that could be ordered in addition to, or instead of, personal
recognizance. These included placing the defendant in the custody
of a designated person, restricting travel and association, or requiring
the execution of an appearance bond with a deposit of up to ten
percent of that bond in the registry of the court.2 In the case of a
20. Ervin, Legislative Role, supra note 17, at 435.
21. Id. at 436.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 430.
25. Bail Reform Act of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-465, 80 Stat. 214 (1966) reprinted
in 1966 U.S.C.C.A.N. 241 (codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 1341-3151 (1982)) [hereinafter
cited as codified]. Section 2 of Pub. L. No. 89-465 provided:
The purpose of this Act is to revise the practice relating to bail to assure that
all persons, regardless of their financial status, shall not needlessly be detained,
pending their appearance to answer charges, to testify, or pending appeal,
when detention serves neither the ends of justice nor the public interest.
Id. See also H.R. REP. No. 1541, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1966), reprinted in 1966
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2293, 2295.
26. Id.
27. See 18 U.S.C. § 3146(a) (1982) (current version at 18 U.S.C. § 3142 (1988
& Supp. 11 1990)) Section 3146(a) states:
Any person charged with an offense, other than an offense punishable by
death, shall, at his appearance before a judicial officer, be ordered released
pending trial on his personal recognizance or upon the execution of an
unsecured appearance bond in an amount specified by the judicial officer,
unless the officer determines, in the exercise of his discretion, that such a
release will not reasonably assure the appearance of the person as required. ...
Id.
28. 18 U.S.C. § 3146(a)(l)-(5) (1982).
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substantial risk of flight, the court could still demand that the
defendant execute a bail bond with sureties. 29
In addition, the 1966 Bail Reform Act listed numerous factors
for the courts to consider in setting bail.3 0 Congress specifically
omitted "danger to the community" as a factor that could be
considered by the courts in setting bail because Congress considered
this factor as inconsistent with the traditional purpose of bail-
assuring the defendant's appearance in court.3' As a result, Congress
also rejected the notion of preventive detention-detaining an ac-
cused in order to prevent the accused from continuing criminal
activity while awaiting trial.3 2
Three years later, in 1969, a new presidential administration
called on Congress to reform the federal bail system. In response
to the increase in crime, President Nixon issued a directive urging
Congress to modify the Bail Reform Act of 1966 to allow for the
temporary detention of defendants who presented a clear danger to
the community while out on bail. 33 Based on this presidential direc-
tive, the United States Department of Justice, headed by Attorney
General John Mitchell, proposed an amendment to the Bail Reform
Act of 1966. 34
This amendment would have authorized the federal courts to
hold pretrial detention hearings to determine whether a defendant
should be incarcerated for up to sixty days upon a finding that he
was charged with a crime of violence and that his release presented
a danger to society. 35 The Attorney General explained that the acute
increase in crime necessitated these changes. 36 It was necessary to
amend the statute because the Bail Reform Act of 1966 excluded
danger to the community as a factor the courts could consider in
29. 18 U.S.C. § 3146(a)(4) (1982).
30. 18 U.S.C. § 3146(b) (1982). This section prescribed that, in determining
conditions of release which would reasonably assure the defendant's appearance in
court, the judicial officer is to consider: the nature and circumstances of the offense,
the weight of the evidence, and the defendant's financial resources, family ties, record
of employment, character and mental condition, length of residence in the community,
criminal record and his record of appearance or flight in previous cases.
31. Ervin, Legislative Role, supra note 17, at 447.
32. Id. at 443.
33. 27 CoNG. Q. WKLy. REP. 238 (Feb. 7, 1969) (cited in John N. Mitchell,
Bail Reform and the Constitutionality of Pretrial Detention, 55 VA. L. REv. 1223
(1969)).
34. S. 2600, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969) (cited in Mitchell, supra note 33, at
1223 n.2).
35. 115 CONG. REc. S2600 (daily ed. July 11, 1969) (cited in Mitchell, supra
note 33, at 1223 n.2).
36. "Tlhe crisis we face from crime in our streets . . . makes it imperative for
action to be taken along those lines." Letter from John Mitchell to the Speaker of the
House of Representatives (July 11, 1969), microformed on CIS No. 70-H301-40
(Congressional Info. Serv.).
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setting bail.17 In order to deal with those defendants who posed such
a substantial threat to the community that their release was consid-
ered dangerous, the statute would have to be modified to allow for
the detention of these individuals without bail.3 8 Attorney General
Mitchell proposed limiting the period of pretrial detention to sixty
days in order to mitigate the "burden of confinement" and to ensure
that such detention did not violate due process. 9 The bill to amend
the Federal Bail Reform Act of 1966, however, died in committee.4
B. The District of Columbia Bail Reform Legislation
Although Congress did not amend the 1966 Act at that time, it
did adopt the proposal to reform the bail procedures employed in
the District of Columbia. 4' Despite significant opposition,42 Congress
37. See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
38. Mitchell, supra note 33, at 1223.
39. Id. at 1239.
40. A bill authorizing preventive detention for federal criminal defendants was
introduced in the Senate on July 11, 1969 (S2600, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969); see
also 115 CONG. REC. at 19,256 (1969)) and in the House of Representatives (H.R.
12606, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969); see also 115 CONG. REc. 19,352 (1969)). The Senate
bill was referred to the Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights, which
refused to report the bill for further consideration. The subcommittee of the House
Judiciary Committee also refused to take any further action on the bill. See Sam J.
Ervin, Jr., Preventive Detention, A Species of Lydford Law, 52 GEO. WAsH. L. REv.
113 (1983) [hereinafter Preventive Detention].
41. For a thorough analysis of the District of Columbia bail reform legislation,
see Frederick D. Hess, Pretrial Detention and the 1970 District of Columbia Crime
Act-The Next Step in Bail Reform, 37 BROOK. L. REv. 277 (1971).
42. Senator Sam Ervin described the proposed District of Columbia Ball Reform
legislation as "[a] bill to repeal the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth and Eighth Amendments to
the Constitution." Hearings Before Senate Judiciary Committee, 91st Cong., 2d Sess.
(1970) microformed on CIS No. S301-10.1 at 2079 (Congressional Info. Serv.). He also
characterized the proposed detention hearing as a "sort of a kangaroo court hearing"
and as "a merry-go-round," by which "you can keep a man in jail until Gabriel's
Horn is silent." Hearings before the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 91st Cong.,
2d Sess. (1970), microformed on CIS No. S521-28 at 273-276 (Congressional Info.
Serv.). Congressman Abner Mikva proclaimed, "Masquerading as a crime-stopper,
preventive detention is really a justice-stopper. In allowing the detention of accused
persons before being adjudged guilty, this procedure itself perpetrates a 'crime of
punishment without trial."' 115 CONG. REc. at 37,373 (Dec. 5, 1969). Senator Muskie
declared that the proposal for pretrial detention:
reflects a concept which runs counter to the presumption of innocence until
guilt is proven beyond a reasonable doubt ... an individual is deprived of
his liberty on the mere possibility that he will be dangerous if released on
bail and the probability that he is guilty of the crime for which he has been
charged.... This is too high a price to pay for an 'acceptable legislative
compromise.' . .. The law we write for the District should be a model for
all the 50 States. Instead, the provisions of this conference report make the
people of the District subjects for an experiment in repression.
116 CONG. REc., at 25, 187-90 (daily ed. July 21, 1970).
[Vol. 60
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did finally pass the District of Columbia bail reform legislation on
July 29, 1970. 41 This bail reform statute served as a prototype for
the federal Bail Reform Act of 1984, providing much of the language
for the Act." Although it appears that a provision of the District
of Columbia statute limiting pretrial detention to a period of sixty
days eased its passage, 45 when Congress relied on this legislation to
revise the federal bail system, it omitted any provision limiting the
length of pretrial confinement.46
The District of Columbia Bail Reform legislation authorized the
courts to consider both danger to the community and risk of flight
when setting bail. 47 If the court found that a person was charged
43. District of Columbia Court Reorganization Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-
358, 84 Stat. 473 (1970).
44. Compare 18 U.S.C. §§ 3141-51 (1982) with D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 23-1321 to
1332 (1981).
45. Local District of Columbia editorials written or broadcast in favor of the
passage of the bill, stressed the importance of the section of the legislation which
limited the duration of pretrial detention to just sixty days:
It is our belief that the 1966 [Bail Reform Act) law should be changed. As
matters stand, a federal judge can consider only one thing in passing upon a
request for bail in a non-capital case-whether an accused person is likely to
show up for his trial or whether he can be expected to flee to avoid trial.
This limited discretion, we think, should be enlarged to permit a judge to
take into consideration the danger to the community that could be created if
a particular suspect were to be released prior to his trial. This is what is
known as preventive detention.
Under a bill proposed by the Nixon administration, this additional
discretion would be subject to tight restrictions. Preventive detention would
apply only in the case of very serious felonies. The period of detention could
not exceed 60 days ....
Editorial from THE EVENING STAR, Oct. 22, 1969, microformed on CIS No. H301-2.7
(emphasis added). Another editorial comment included the following: "The City
Government is properly concerned with protecting the rights of the accused. But, we
believe the Administration bill provides adequate safeguards. The suspect would have
to go to trial within 60 days after arrest. . . ." Editorial Broadcast by WMAL/AM/
FM/TV, July 13, 1969, microformed on CIS No. H301-2.7 (Congressional Info. Serv.)
(emphasis added). Another commentary included:
Under the administration's proposal, carefully-designated suspects may be
detained up to 60 days, but only on an order of the court and only after a
full hearing. This is a drastic policy, for its net effect is to impose imprisonment
in advance of conviction. But in this particular respect, the right of society
to a reasonable degree of safety needs to be reinforced.
A WTOP Editorial, October 22 & 23, 1969, microformed on CIS No. H301-2.7
(Congressional Info. Serv.) (emphasis added).
46. For a discussion of Congress' decision to omit any provisions limiting the
length of pretrial detention, see infra nn. 95-108 and accompanying text.
47. See D.C. CODE A.. § 23-1321(b) (1989).
In determining which conditions of release, if any, will reasonably assure the
appearance of a person as required or the safety of any other person or the
community, the judicial officer shall, on. the basis of available information,
take into account such matters as the nature and circumstances of the offense
19921
TENNESSEE LA W REVIEW
with a dangerous crime, 48 or a crime of violence4 9 or with the
obstruction or attempt to obstruct justice, 0 the court was permitted
to hold a detention hearing. At that hearing, the court could order
the detention of the defendant if it found by clear and convincing
evidence that no conditions of release would reasonably assure the
safety of any other person or the community,5' and by a "substantial
probability' 5 2 that the defendant committed the offense charged.
The legislation required that the trial of a detained defendant be
placed on an expedited calendar. 3 It limited the pretrial detention
to a period of just sixty days, unless the trial was in progress or the
defendant had caused the delay in getting the case to trial.5 4
The statute specifically stated that the filing of pretrial motions
by the defendant could not be used to extend the sixty-day limitation
on pretrial detention." The language regarding the filing of motions
by the defendant was added by the House of Representatives on
July 14, 1970, just two weeks before Congress passed the legisla-
tion.56 This addition was made "in order to make it perfectly clear ' 5 7
charged, the weight of the evidence against such person, his family ties,
employment, financial resources, character and mental conditions, past con-
duct, length of residence in the community, record of convictions, and any
record of appearance at court proceedings, flight to avoid prosecution, or
failure to appear at court proceedings.
Id.
48. D.C. CODE ANN. § 23-1322(a)(1) (1989).
49. D.C. CODE ANN. § 23-1322(a)(2) (1989).
50. D.C. CODE ANN. § 23-1322(a)(3) (1989).
51. D.C. CODE ANN. § 23-1322(b)(1)-(2) (1989).
52. D.C. CODE ANN. § 23-1322(b)(2)(C) (1989). In reporting on the proposed
legislation that ultimately became the Bail Reform Act of 1984, the Senate Judiciary
Committee referred to the "substantial probability" provision as an "overzealous
exercise of legislative precaution," which constituted the "principal reason cited by
prosecutors for the failure over the last ten years to request pretrial detention hearings"
under the District of Columbia Bail Reform statute. Although the Senate committee
concluded that the "substantial probability" requirement did provide some additional
protection against the possibility of authorizing pretrial detention for defendants who
are ultimately acquitted, it decided that "the validity of the charges against the
defendant" would be assured because pursuant to Rules 4(a) and 5(a) of the Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure, the court must find by probable cause, that the defendant
committed the offense with which he is charged, both at his initial appearance and
then later at either a preliminary hearing or through the filing of a grand jury indictment.
Thus the bill contained no "substantial probability" requirement. S. REP. No. 98-147,
98th Cong., 1st Sess. 9, 45 (1983).
53. D.C. CODE ANN. § 23-1322(d)(1) (1989).
54. D.C. CODE ANN. § 23-1322(d)(2)(A) (1989).
55. D.C. CODE ANN. § 23-1322(d)(2)(A) (1989). A person shall be entitled to
release "upon the expiration of sixty calendar days, unless the trial is in progress or
the trial has been delayed at the request of the person other than by the filing of
timely motions (excluding motions for continuances)". Id. (emphasis added).
56. H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 91-1303, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 239-40 (1970) micro-
formed on, CIS No. H303-22.
57. Id.
[Vol. 60
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that any delay in the trial resulting from the defendant's filing of
timely motions, such as a motion to suppress illegally obtained
evidence or a motion for discovery, would not be considered a
"delay at the request of the defendant." 8 Twelve years later, on
July 21, 1982, the City Council of the District of Columbia amended
the provisions of the District of Columbia Code 9 to permit an
extension of pretrial detention from sixty to ninety days upon a
showing of "good cause" by the prosecutor, but only for the
"additional time required to prepare for the expedited trial" of a
detained defendant. 6
C. United States v. Edwards
Eleven years after its passage, the District of Columbia Court
of Appeals heard a constitutional challenge of the District of Co-
lumbia Bail Reform statute. In United States v. Edwards6 l the
defendant challenged the bail statute on a number of constitutional
bases. He argued that pretrial detention constituted impermissible
punishment before an adjudication of guilt in violation of the
principle recognized in Bell v. Wolfish, 62 denied him substantive and
procedural due process, 63 and violated the "Excessive Bail Clause"
of the Eighth Amendment."
The Court of Appeals rejected each of these arguments and
upheld the constitutionality of the statute .6 The defendant contended
that pretrial detention violated the Fifth Amendment because it
constituted impermissible punishment before an adjudication of guilt.6
Addressing the defendant's argument that confinement before trial
always constitutes punishment, 67 the court found it was necessary to
determine whether pretrial detention was "penal" or "regulatory"
58. Id.
59. District of Columbia Bail Amendment Act of 1982, No. 4-223, 29 D.C.
Reg. No. 33, 3479, 3480 (codified at D.C. CODE ANN. § 23-1321 (1989)).
60. D.C. CODE ANN. § 23-1322(d)(4) (1989).
61. 430 A.2d 1321 (D.C. 1981) (en banc), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1022 (1982).
62. Id. at 1331. "Under the Due Process Clause, a detainee may not be punished
prior to an adjudication of guilt in accordance with Due Process." Id. (citing Bell v.
Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 534-35 (1978)).
63. Id. at 1333, 1341.
64. Id. at 1325-30. Because this Article focuses on the issue of whether and
when pretrial detention constitutes impermissible punishment in violation of substantive
due process, the arguments regarding the Eighth Amendment as well as the procedural
Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment will not be addressed here. For a thorough
analysis of United States v. Edwards, see David J. Rabinowitz, Comment, Preventive
Detention and United States v. Edwards: Burdening The Innocent, 32 AM. U. L. REv.
191 (1982).
65. See Edwards, 430 A.2d at 1324.
66. Id. at 1331.
67. Id.
1992]
TENNESSEE LA W REVIEW
in order to decide whether it constituted impermissible punishment
or permissible regulation. 68 Although recognizing that it is sometimes
difficult to determine whether a sanction is penal or regulatory, 69
the court relied on the test set out by the United States Supreme
Court in Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez0 and reaffirmed in Bell v.
Wolfish, 7' to decide the question. 72
The District of Columbia Court of Appeals found the charac-
terization of pretrial detention to be a "close question ' ' 73 but con-
cluded that pretrial detention was regulatory not penal. 74 The
traditional reasons behind pretrial detention, the prevention of flight
and the intimidation of witnesses, did not seek to punish the defen-
dant for past behavior but, rather, sought to prevent any future
behavior which would jeopardize the integrity of the judicial proc-
ess. 75 The court also found that pretrial detention to prevent the
commission of dangerous acts by the detainee was not intended to
punish the defendant for prior acts but to "curtail reasonably
predictable conduct" in the future. 76
The court examined the statutory history of the District of
Columbia legislation, concluding that Congress intended pretrial
detention to protect the safety of the community, not to punish the
accused. 77 The court stated that pretrial detention permitted by the
District of Columbia bail statute was not intended to promote any
goal of punishment-retribution, deterrence or rehabilitation. 7 The
statute was "closely circumscribed ' 79 so as not to exceed its goal of
incapacitating a potentially dangerous defendant before trial. In so
concluding, the court of appeals specifically cited section 23-
68. Id.
69. Id. ("The distinction ... is often elusive ....
70. 372 U.S. 144, 164-69 (1963).
71. 441 U.S. 520 (1979).
72. The District of Columbia Court of Appeals set forth the test as follows:
Whether the sanction involves an affirmative disability or restraint, whether
it has historically been regarded as punishment, whether it comes into play
only on a finding of scienter, whether its operation will promote the traditional
aims of punishment-retribution and deterrence, whether the behavior to
which it applies is already a crime, whether an alternative purpose to which
it may rationally be connected is assignable for it, and whether it appears
excessive in relation to the alternative purpose assigned ....
United States v. Edwards, 430 A.2d 1321, 1332 (D.C. 1981) (en banc), cert. denied,
455 U.S. 1022 (1982) (quoting Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 168-69
(1963) (footnotes omitted), quoting Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 537-38 (1979)).
73. Edwards, 430 A.2d at 1331.
74. Id. at 1332.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 1333.
79. Id.
[Vol. 60
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1322(d)(2)(A) of the District of Columbia bail statute which required
that pretrial detention be limited to sixty days, by which time the
detainee's trial must have begun or bail must have been set.80 The
court viewed this as proof that Congress had carefully restricted
pretrial detention to ensure that the defendant was merely incapac-
itated for a limited period before trial and not punished for an
extended period before a finding of guilt.8 '
D. The Operation of the Bail Reform Act of 1984
Armed with the District of Columbia legislation authorizing
pretrial detention on the ground of danger to the community and
the decision in United States v. Edwards2 upholding the constitu-
tionality of the District of Columbia bail statute, Congress set out
to modify the Bail Reform Act of 1966. By this time Congress was
determined to address what it perceived to be "the alarming problem
of crimes committed by persons on release." 83 Congress intended to
authorize courts "to make release decisions that give appropriate
recognition to the danger a person may pose to others if released."8 s4
Consequently, in passing the Bail Reform Act of 1984,85 Congress
expanded the list of factors a judicial officer could consider in
determining whether bail should be set in a particular case to include
"the nature and seriousness of the danger to any person or the
community that would be posed by the person's release." 8 6 Further-
80. Id. See also D.C. CODE ANN. § 23-1322(d)(2)(A) (1989).
81. See Edwards, 430 A.2d at 1333.
82. Id. at 1324.
83. S. REP. No. 225, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1983), reprinted in 1984
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3185.
84. Id.
85. 18 U.S.C. §§ 3141-3156 (1988).
86. 18 U.S.C. § 3142(g)(4) (1988). This section requires the judicial officer
consider the available information concerning:
(1) the nature and circumstances of the offense charged;
(2) the weight of the evidence;
(3) the history and characteristics of the person including:
(a) the defendant's character;
(b) his physical and mental condition;
(c) his family ties;
(d) his employment history;
(e) his financial resources;
(f) his length of residence in the community;
(g) his ties to the community;
(h) his past conduct;
(i) his history of drug of alcohol abuse;
0) his criminal history;
(k) his previous record of appearances at court proceedings;
(1) whether at the time of the current offense or arrest, he was on
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more, Congress authorized that either the Government87 or the court s'
could move for the pretrial detention of the defendant.
In order to detain a defendant, the statute requires that the court
hold a hearing where the judicial officer must determine "whether
any condition or combination of conditions ... will reasonably
assure the appearance of such person as required and the safety of
any other person and/or the community. . . ."19 The Act provides
the defendant with certain procedural rights at this detention hear-
ing, 90 requiring the judicial officer to find by clear and convincing
evidence "that no condition or combination of conditions will rea-
sonably assure the safety of any other person and the community." 9
Although the Act does not specifically state the Government's burden
of proof regarding risk of flight, several courts have held that the
Government need only show risk of flight by a preponderance of
the evidence. 92 Significantly, the Bail Reform Act of 1984 does not
contain a major protection of the District of Columbia Bail Reform
legislation-that the case of a pretrial detainee be placed on an
probation, parole or other release pending trial, sentencing, appeal or
completion of a sentence; and
(4) the seriousness of the danger the defendant's release would pose to any
person or the community.
See id.
87. See 18 U.S.C. § 3142(f)(l)-(2) (1988). The Government may move for a
detention hearing when the case involves:
(1) a crime of violence;
(2) an offense for which the maximum sentence is life imprisonment or death;
(3) a drug offense carrying a maximum term of imprisonment of 10 years or
more;
(4) any felony committed after the person has been convicted of two or more
of the above offenses (state or federal).
See id.
88. See 18 U.S.C. § 3142(f)(2) (1988). The Government or the court may request
a detention hearing where it believes that a case involves:
1) a serious risk of flight; or
2) a serious risk that the defendant will or will attempt to obstruct justice or
risk that the defedant will or will attempt to threaten, injure or intimidate
a prospective witness or juror.
See id.
89. 18 U.S.C. § 3142(f) (1988).
90. Id. This section provides the defendant the right:
(1) to be represented by counsel, either retained or appointed;
(2) to testify;
(3) to present witnesses on his own behalf;
(4) to cross-examine witnesses who appear at the hearing; and
(5) to present information by proffer or otherwise.
See id.
91. 18 U.S.C. § 3142(e) (1988).
92. United States v. Himler, 797 F.2d 156, 161 (3d Cir. 1986); United States v.
Portes, 786 F.2d 758, 765 (7th Cir. 1985); United States v. Medina, 775 F.2d 1398,
1402 (11th Cir. 1985).
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expedited trial calendar, 93 with the duration of pretrial detention
being limited to a specific period of time.Y
E. The Legislative History of the Federal Bail Reform Act
The Senate Judiciary Committee rejected the setting of a specific
time period beyond which a defendant could not be detained. Rather,
it looked to the provisions of the Speedy Trial Act, 95 to set the
necessary time limits:
93. See D.C. CODE ARN. § 23-1322(d) (1989):
The following shall be applicable to persons detained pursuant to this section:
(1) The case of such person shall be placed on an expedited calendar and,
consistent with the sound administration of justice, his trial shall be given
priority.
(2) Such person shall be treated in accordance with section 23-1321 [allowing
for pretrial release in other than first degree murder cases]-
(A) upon the expiration of sixty calendar days, unless the trial is in
progress or the trial has been delayed at the request of the person
other than by the filing of timely motions (excluding motions for
continuances); or
(B) whenever a judicial officer finds that a subsequent event has eliminated
the basis for such detention.
Id.
94. See D.C. CODE ANN. § 23-1322(d)(4) (1989). This section states:
Notwithstanding the sixty calendar day provision of paragraph (2)(A), any
such person may be detained for an additional period not to exceed thirty
days from the date of the expiration of such sixty calendar day period on
the basis of a petition submitted by the United States attorney and approved
by the judicial officer. Such additional period of detention may be granted
only on the basis of good cause shown and shall be granted only for the
additional time required to prepare for the expedited trial of such person.
For the purposes of determining the maximum period of detention under this
section, such a period not to exceed ninety days, the period begins on the
date the defendant is first detained after arrest, and includes the days detained
pending a detention hearing and the days in confinement on temporary
detention under subsection (e) whether or not continuous with full pretrial
detention.
Id.
95. See 18 U.S.C. § 3161(c)(1). This section states:
In any case in which a plea of not guilty is entered, the trial of a defendant
charged in an information or indictment with the commission of an offense
shall commence within seventy days from the filing date (and making public)
of the information or indictment, or from the date the defendant has appeared
before a judicial officer of the court in which such charge is pending, whichever
date last occurs. If a defendant consents in writing to be tried before a
magistrate on a complaint, the trial shall commence within seventy days from
the date of such consent.
Id. See also 18 U.S.C. § 3164:
(a) The trial or other disposition of cases involving-
(1) a detained person who is being held in detention solely because he is
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18 U.S.C. 3161, (sic) [of the Speedy Trial Act] specifically requires
that priority be given to a case in which a defendant is detained,
and also requires that his trial must, in any event, occur within 90
days, subject to certain periods of excludable delay ..... These
current limitations are sufficient to assure that a person is not
detained pending trial for an extended period of time.9
The Senate Judiciary Committee also rejected an amendment to the
Speedy Trial Act 97 that would have reduced the period in which a
pretrial detainee must be brought to trial from ninety to sixty days. 98
awaiting trial, and
(2) a released person who is awaiting trial and has been designated by
the attorney for the Government as being of high risk, shall be
accorded priority.
(b) The trial of any person described in subsection (a)(l) or (a)(2) of this
section shall commence not later than ninety days following the beginning
of such continuous detention or designation of high risk by the attorney
for the Government. The periods of delay enumerated in section 3161(h)
are excluded in computing the time limitation specified in this section.
(c) Failure to commence trial of a detainee as specified in subsection (b),
through no fault of the accused or his counsel, or failure to commence
trial of a designated releasee as specified in subsection (b), through no
fault of the attorney for the Government, shall result in the automatic
review by the court of the conditions of release. No detainee, as defined
in subsection (a) shall be held in custody pending trial after the expiration
of such ninety-day period required for the commencement of his trial. A
designated releasee, as defined in subsection (a), who is found by the
court to have intentionally delayed the trial of his case shall be subject to
an order of the court modifying his nonfinancial conditions of release
under this title to insure that he shall appear at trial as required.
Id. (emphasis added). For a thorough discussion of the interaction between the Bail
Reform Act of 1984 and the Speedy Trial Act of 1974, see Allen Daniel Applbaum,
Note, As Time Goes By: Pretrial Incarceration Under the Bail Reform Act of 1984
and the Speedy Trial Act of 1974, 8 CARDOzo LAW REv. 1055 (1987).
96. See S. REP. No. 225, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 22 n.63 (1983), reprinted in
1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3205.
97. 18 U.S.C. §§ 3161-3174 (1988).
98. 130 CONG. Rnc. S945 (daily ed. Feb. 3, 1984) (Senator Grassley stated, "No
evidence has been presented that at any time in our hearings [on the Bail Reform Act]
that the 90 day Speedy Trial Act limit has not worked perfectly well to protect against
lengthy incarceration.")
In an April 19, 1983 letter from Robert A. McConnell, Assistant Attorney General,
Office of Legislative Affairs, United States Department of Justice, to Senator Strom
Thurmond, Chairman of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, Mr. McConnell
strongly opposed such an amendment, stating that, "We have no doubt that the
proposed amendment is well intentioned and agree that a speedy trial is especially
important where a defendant must, for the protection of the integrity of the judicial
process or the safety of the community be held pending trial. But the problems posed
by the proposed reduction to 60 days of the Speedy Trial Act's present limit on pretrial
detention are simply too great to justify its enactment as a menas [sic] of furthering
this principle." S. REP. No. 98-147, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. app. at 93 (1983), microformed
on CIS No. 83-S523-8 (Congressional Info. Serv.).
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The Senate debate concerning the Bail Reform Act indicates that
several senators believed that the ninety-day time period for bringing
a detained defendant's case to trial under the Speedy Trial Act was
firm and not likely to expand." The senators apparently were not
interested in, or at least not aware of, the practical reality of the
Speedy Trial Act,'00 which permits the exclusion of time from the
ninety-day limit on eighteen separate grounds.10 These exclusions
include delay resulting from the filing of any interlocutory appeal, 0 2
the filing of pretrial motions by either side, 03 or the granting of a
continuance based on the judge's findings that the ends of justice
served by taking such action outweigh the interest of the public and
the defendant in holding a speedy trial. °4 Once the court finds an
exclusion of time under any one of these grounds, the Speedy Trial
Act stops the clock from running, and the ninety-day period is
tolled. 0 15 This tolling delays the case of a detained defendant from
proceeding to trial within the ninety-day period required by the
Speedy Trial Act.'06 It results in further, and often protracted,
incarceration of a presumptively innocent individual.'0
The lower federal courts quickly recognized that the Speedy Trial
Act would not serve to protect defendants against lengthy pretrial
incarceration.
[Elxperience under the combined operation of these two statutes
[the Speedy Trial Act and the Bail Reform Act] may demonstrate
that the realities of preparing for the trial of complex cases having
99. Senator Thurmond told the Senate that "the 90 days is the worst case
limit," 130 CONG. REC. S941 (daily ed. Feb. 3, 1984); Senator Laxalt referred to the
90 day limit as the "upper bound," id. at S943; and Senator Grassley stated that "no
defendant will be detained indefinitely while the processes of justice grind to a halt,"
id. at 945.
100. 18 U.S.C. §§ 3161-3174 (1988).
101. 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(1)-(9) (1988). These exclusions caused the Third Circuit
to refer to the law as "the rather porous provisions of the Speedy Trial Act." United
States v. Perry, 788 F.2d 100, 118 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 864 (1986).
102. 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(l)(E) (1988).
103. 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(1)(F) (1988).
104. 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(8)(A) (1988).
105. The preceding periods of delay "shall be excluded in computing the time
within which an information or an indictment must be filed, or in computing the time
within which the trial of any such offense must commence .. " 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)
(1988).
106. 18 U.S.C. § 3164(b) (1988).
107. See e.g., United States v. Infelise, 934 F.2d 103, 104 (7th Cir. 1991)
("defendants will have spent two years in jail without having been proved guilty of a
crime."); United States v. Ojeda Rios, 846 F.2d 167, 168 (2d Cir. 1988) (over thirty-
two months); United States v. Melendez-Carrion, 790 F.2d 984, 999 (2d Cir. 1986)
(over eight months); United States v. Noriega, 746 F. Supp. 1548, 1558 (S.D. Fla.
1990) (over one year); and United States v. Gatto, 750 F. Supp. 664, 673 (D.N.J.
1990) (over eighteen months).
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numerous defendants and multi-count indictments are such that
this congressional expectation [of having detained defendants being
tried within ninety days] and policy may occasionally be frus-
trated .... Exclusions authorized by 3161(h) for pretrial motions
by both sides, scheduling difficulties as well as unforeseeable delays
granted in the interests of justice, may combine to so delay a trial
that the Speedy Trial Act might not "work perfectly well to protect
against lengthy incarceration." In such a case, the length of a
defendant's pretrial detention might not survive a proper due
process challenge.108
II. THE ACT'S FACIAL CONSTITUTIONALITY: UNITED STATES V.
SALERNO
In 1987, for the first and, thus far, only time the United States
Supreme Court considered a constitutional challenge to the Act. 1' 9
Anthony Salerno and Vincent Cafaro were arrested on March 21,
1986. Along with thirteen others, they were charged in a twenty-
nine count indictment." 0 At the arraignment of the defendants, the
Government conceded that neither Salerno nor Cafaro posed a risk
of flight."' The prosecution argued for pretrial detention, however,
based on the defendants' indictment for crimes of violence stemming
from their alleged involvement in organized crime." 2 The Govern-
ment contended that no conditions of bail would assure the safety
of the community or any other person if either Salerno or Cafaro
were released." 3
108. United States v. Colombo, 777 F.2d 96, 101 (2d Cir. 1985) (footnotes
omitted). See also Melendez-Carrion, 790 F.2d at 996 ("it may well be that the Senate
did not fully appreciate just how long pretrial detention might last under the exclusions
of the Speedy Trial Act"); United States v. Gallo, 653 F. Supp. 320, 342 (E.D.N.Y.
1986) ("[Elxtended imprisonment has become the rule rather than the exception
whenever pretrial detention is used in complex, multi-count, multi-defendant ac-
tions .... Excludable time provisions of the Speedy Trial Act often push back the
trial for months, and even years, despite the possible detention of defendants ... ").
109. United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739 (1987).
110. The charges were as follows:
one count of conspiracy to violate the Racketeer Influence and Corrupt
Organizations Act ("RICO"), in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d) (1982); one
count of participating in a racketeering enterprise, in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§ 1962(c) (1982); 16 counts of mail fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1341
(1982); one count of wire fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1343 (1982);
eight counts of extortion, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1951 (1982); and one
count of operating an illegal bookmaking business and one count of operating
an illegal numbers business, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1955 (1982).
United States v. Salerno, 794 F.2d 64, 66-67 (2d Cir. 1986), rev'd 481 U.S. 739 (1987).
111. United States v. Salerno, 631 F. Supp. 1364, 1366 (S.D.N.Y.), vacated 794
F.2d 64 (2d Cir. 1986), rev'd 481 U.S. 739 (1987).
112. Id.
113. Id.
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At the detention hearing, the prosecution proffered the testimony
of two Government witnesses who, in the past, had testified in the
trials of other organized crime figures."14 It also presented evidence
from the search of an apartment where Cafaro lived and Salerno
visited, as well as excerpts from wiretaps placed at various loca-
tions." 5 The evidence proffered by the Government related largely
to the defendants' alleged involvement in murder conspiracies and
violence connected to their labor, loansharking and gambling enter-
prises." 6
Following the hearing, the district court granted the Govern-
ment's motion for detention." 7 The court found that there was clear
and convincing evidence that, due to their alleged involvement in
violent crime, the two defendants presented a danger to society."18
The court ordered the defendants detained because it found that no
conditions of release could reasonably assure that the defendants
would not endanger the safety of the community." 9
On appeal, the defendants argued, among other things, that the
provision of the Bail Reform Act codified at section 3142(e), Title
18 of the United States Code, violated their rights to due process. 20
The defendants contended that this provision was unconstitutional
because it allowed the court to order them held without bail pending
a trial, solely on the ground that if released, they posed a danger
to the community.' 2' The United States Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit agreed, holding that the "Due Process Clause pro-
hibits pretrial detention on the ground of danger to the community
as a regulatory measure, without regard to the duration of the
detention." 122
The Second Circuit first noted that the only basis for this
detention order was the finding that, if released, the defendants
would likely continue their criminal business which involved threats
and crimes of violence, thus posing a danger to the community. 23
The court further found that the pretrial detention of these defen-
dants on this basis was unconstitutional because the deprivation of
liberty in order to prevent future crimes violated due process. 24 The
114. Id. at 1367.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 1367-70.
117. Id. at 1375.
118. See id. ("When business as usual involves threats, beatings, and murders,
the present danger such people pose to the community is self-evident.").
119. Id. at 1371, 1375.
120. United States v. Salerno, 794 F.2d 64, 71 (2d Cir. 1986), rev'd 481 U.S.
739 (1987).
121. Id.
122. Id. at 71.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 71-72.
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court rejected the Government's contention that 18 U.S.C. § 3142(e)
was a rational means of achieving the regulatory goal of protecting
the public safety.1 2 Although the court appreciated the objective of
protecting the public from harm, it found that this goal could not
be accomplished by incarcerating those merely accused and not
convicted of crimes. 26 Citing United States v. Melendez-Carrion,12 7
the court rejected the regulatory test advanced by the Government:
The fallacy of using such a test can be readily seen from consid-
eration of preventive detention as applied to persons not arrested
for any offense. It cannot seriously be maintained that under our
Constitution the Government could jail people not accused of any
crime simply because they were thought likely to commit crimes in
the future. Yet such a police state approach would undoubtedly be
a rational means of advancing the compelling state interest in
public safety. In a constitutional system where liberty is protected
both substantively and procedurally by the limitations of the Due
Process Clause, a total deprivation of liberty cannot validly be
accomplished [on the sole ground that] doing so is a rational means
of regulating to promote even a substantial government interest.1 28
In finding that the incarceration of a presumptively innocent
individual to prevent future crimes exceeds the limits of due process,
the court concluded that the Fifth Amendment permits the incarcer-
ation of individuals only as a punitive measure after they have been
convicted of a crime and not as a regulatory measure to control the
activities of those merely accused of a crime. 29 The court rejected
the Government's position that the mere filing of criminal charges
against individuals for alleged past criminal activity permitted the
regulation of their conduct through detention. 130 Finally, the court
found that "[tihe proper remedy for charges of past crimes, assuming
they are proven," is the imposition of a penalty after trial and not
incarceration before trial.'3
On certiorari, the United States Supreme Court reversed. 3 2 For
the first time in the history of this country, the Supreme Court
upheld the constitutionality of a statute that permitted the pretrial
incarceration of adult defendants merely charged with, but not
convicted of, noncapital offenses.'33 In a six-to-three decision, deliv-
ered by Chief Justice Rehnquist, the Court found that the Act is
125. Id. at 72-73
126. Id. at 73.
127. 790 F.2d 984 (2d Cir. 1986).
128. Salerno, 794 F.2d at 72 (citing Melendez-Carrion, 790 F.2d at 1000-01).
129. See id. at 73-74.
130. Id. at 72-73.
131. Id. at 73.
132. United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 741 (1987).
133. Id.
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not facially unconstitutional under either the Due Process Clause of
the Fifth Amendment'3 4 or the Excessive Bail Clause of the Eighth
Amendment.'
The Court first examined the issue of whether the Act violates
substantive due process because it authorizes impermissible punish-
ment before trial in violation of the principle set forth in Bell v.
Wolfish. 36 In order to make this determination, the Court examined
the legislative history of the Act to ascertain whether Congress
intended to punish or merely regulate the conduct of those whose
detention was sought by the Government or the court.' It reiterated
Congress' position that the Act is a legislative response to "the
alarming problem of crimes committed by persons on release."' 3
The Court found that unless Congress expressly intended to punish
the detained defendant, the "punitive/regulatory distinction" 3 9 turns
on whether the restriction serves some valid regulatory purpose and
is not excessive in effecting this goal. 14 In examining the legislative
history, the Court concluded that Congress intended for pretrial
detention of adult defendants to address the problem of continued
criminal activity by those released on bail and not to punish dan-
gerous individuals.' 41
The Court looked to its recent decision in Schall v. Martin to
decide the issue. 142 In that case the Court upheld the constitutionality
of a section of the New York Family Court Act that authorized
pretrial detention of an accused juvenile delinquent who posed a
"serious risk' '143 of further criminal activity. The Court held that
the detention authorized by the New York statute served a legitimate
regulatory function and, therefore, did not violate substantive due
process under the Fourteenth Amendment.'" The Court reasoned
that society has a legitimate and compelling interest in protecting
134. Id. at 755.
135. Id. at 752. Because the focus of this Article is the constitutionality of
pretrial detention under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, there will
be no discussion of the Court's ruling with respect to the Eighth Amendment. For a
thorough examination of the Court's decision in United States v. Salerno see Donald
W. Price, Comment, Crime and "Regulation": United States v. Salerno, 48 LA. L.
REv. 743 (1988); Howard, supra note 12; Eason, supra note 12; Lupo, supra note 12.
136. United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. at 746 (citing Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S.
520, 537 (1979)).
137. Id. at 747.
138. Id. at 742 (citing S. REp. No. 225, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1983)).
139. Id. at 747.
140. Id. at 747 (citing Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 373 U.S. 144, 168-69
(1963)).
141. Id. at 747.
142. 467 U.S. 253 (1984).
143. Id. at 255 (citing N.Y. FAm. CT. ACT § 320.5 (McKinney 1983)).
144. Id. at 257.
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itself from crime and protecting juveniles from their own criminal
conduct. 45 Although the Court recognized that juveniles have a
substantial interest in their own liberty, this interest is qualified
because, unlike adults, juveniles are "always in some form of
custody."' l4 The Court also found that because the pretrial confine-
ment in Schall was restricted to a period of just seventeen days, 47
and the place of incarceration was either an open facility in the
community or a secure one which resembled a dormitory, 4 this
limited detention was intended to regulate the juvenile's conduct not
to punish him. 149
Applying the principles of Schall to Salerno50 the Court also
examined the features of the Act and decided that they too reflect
the regulatory, rather than punitive, objectives of the statute.'" As
in Schall, s2 the Bail Reform Act of 1984 requires that individuals
be detained in a "facility separate, to the extent practicable, from
persons awaiting or serving sentences or being held in custody
pending appeal."'' 53 The Court also found, that because the Act
strictly limits the type of cases in which pretrial detention may be
imposed, its regulatory purpose was not violated. 54 Lastly, the Court
found that because the defendant receives a prompt detention
hearing' and "the maximum length of pretrial detention is limited
by the stringent time limitations of the Speedy Trial Act,"' 5 6 the
Act is regulatory. 57
Citing numerous examples, the Court found that under certain
circumstances the government's regulatory interest in community
safety can outweigh an individual's liberty interest in a particular
case. 58 In determining whether the Act is excessive in effecting its
145. Id.
146. Id. at 265.
147. Id. at 270. In relying on Schall v. Martin, the Court in Salerno neglected
to mention that the defendants in the latter case had already spent ten months in
custody by the time their case was heard by the Supreme Court. See id.
148. Id. at 271.
149. Id. at 269.
150. 481 U.S. 739 (1987).
151. Id. at 747-48.
152. 467 U.S. 253 (1984).
153. United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. at 747 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3142(i)(2)). In
practice, however, this is not always the case. See, e.g., United States v. Gallo, 653 F.
Supp. 320, 336, 340 (E.D.N.Y. 1986).
154. Salerno 481 U.S. at 747, (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3142(f)).
155. Id.
156. Id. at 757 (citing 18 U.S.C. §§ 3161-64).
157. In practice, the time limits of the Speedy Trial Act have not proven to be
so stringent and have not effectively restricted the period of pretrial detention. See
supra notes 95-108 and accompanying text.
158. For instance, during wartime the Supreme Court has held the government
may detain individuals whom the government believes to be dangerous. See, e.g.,
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regulatory goal, the Court first noted that the government has a
legitimate and compelling interest in preventing further crime by an
individual who has already been arrested and charged with a criminal
offense.5 9 The Court found that the Act is not excessive because it
narrowly focuses on the critical problem of crime committed by one
already charged with an offense in which the government has an
overwhelming interest;16° it implicates only a limited number of
individuals who have been charged with very serious violations of
the law;' 61 it requires the government to establish by probable cause
that the defendant has committed the charged offense; 62 and through
a detention hearing, the prosecution must persuade the court by
clear and convincing evidence that "no conditions of release can
reasonably assure the safety of the community or any person.' 1 63
The Court found that even though an individual does have a
substantial interest in liberty, under these carefully drawn and limited
circumstances, this interest is outweighed by those of the govern-
ment. 16 The Court concluded that "under these circumstances we
cannot categorically state that pretrial detention 'offends some prin-
ciple of justice so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our
people as to be ranked as fundamental," ' 65 and, therefore, the
Court found no violation of substantive due process. 66
With respect to the defendants' procedural due process challenge
to the Act, the Court stated that it need only find the Act's
procedures "adequate to authorize the pretrial detention of at least
some [persons] charged with crimes.' 1 67 The Court found that the
procedural requirements of the Act pass that test as well.?6 Noting
that "there is nothing inherently unattainable about a prediction of
Ludecke v. Watkins, 335 U.S. 160 (1948) (approved the "unreviewable executive power
to detain enemy aliens in time of war"). This interest in protecting the community's
interest in safety is not limited, however, to wartime. See, e.g., Schall v. Martin, 467
U.S. 253 (1984) (approved a post-arrest regulatory detention of juveniles when they
present a continuing danger to the community); Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103 (1975)
(police may arrest and hold a suspect for a short period of time until a neutral
magistrate determines whether probable cause exists); Carlson v. Landon, 342 U.S.
524, 537-42 (1952) (no absolute constitutional barrier to the detention of potentially
dangerous resident aliens pending deportation proceedings).
159. United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 749 (citing DeVeau v. Brausted,
363 U.S. 144, 155 (1960)).
160. Salerno, 481 U.S. at 750.
161. Id. (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3142(f)).
162. Id. at 750.
163. Id.
164. Id. at 750-51.
165. Id. at 711 (quoting Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97 (1934)).
166. Id.
167. Id. at 751 (quoting Schall, 467 U.S. at 264).
168. Id. at 751.
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future criminal conduct,"'' 69 the Court found that the procedural
requirements of the Act, including the defendant's right to counsel, 70
the right to testify in one's own behalf,'7' the right to present
information by proffer and to cross-examine those witnesses who
appear at the hearing, 72 and the right to immediate appeal of the
decision, 73 militate in favor of an accurate determination that the
defendant presents a danger to the community. Furthermore, the
Court decided that the Act did not violate procedural due process
74
because the Act demands that the Government must prove by clear
and convincing evidence that the defendant poses a threat to the
safety of the community. 75 In addition the court must consider
specific statutory factors in determining whether to detain the
defendant 76 and must prepare written findings of fact and a state-
ment of reasons supporting its decision. 77
The Supreme Court concluded that in view of "the legitimate
and compelling regulatory purpose of the Act and the procedural
protection it offers,' '1 78 the Act was not facially invalid under either
the substantive or procedural Due Process Clause of the Fifth
Amendment. In a footnote, the Court did comment, however, that
"we intimate no view as to the point at which detention in a
particular case might become excessively prolonged, and, therefore,
punitive in relation to Congress' regulatory goal."' 79 The issue,
therefore, remained: at what point in time does detention become
punitive rather than regulatory?
III. WHEN DOES PRETRIAL DETENTION VIOLATE SUBSTANTIVE DUE
PROCESS?
The Fifth Amendment protects against deprivation of liberty
without due process of law'8 0 and prohibits the imposition of pun-
ishment before trial.' 8' Absent extraordinary circumstances, it would
violate due process to imprison a person deemed to be a danger to
society who was not accused of a crime. 8 2 Yet the Bail Reform Act
169. Id. at 751 (quoting Schall, 467 U.S. at 278).
170. Id. (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3142(0).
171. Id. (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3142(f)).
172. Id. (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3142(f)).
173. Id. (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3145(c)).
174. Id.
175. Id. (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3142(f)).
176. Id. at 751-52 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3142(g)).
177. Id. at 752 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3142(i)).
178. Id.
179. Id. at 748 n.4.
180. U.S. CONST. Amend. V.
181. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535 n.16 (1979).
182. United States v. Melendez-Carrion, 790 F.2d 984, 1001 (1986). For such
extraordinary circumstances see supra note 158 and accompanying text.
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of 1984 authorizes the pretrial detention of an accused, who is
presumed innocent, based on the finding that the accused presents
a danger to society or a risk of flight. 83 As discussed, the Supreme
Court in United States v. Salerno' 4 upheld this provision of the Act
as being regulatory rather than punitive, but left open the question
of when such pretrial confinement crosses the line from permissible
regulation to impermissible punishment. 5 This section will explain
how the factors the courts use to make such a determination are
inappropriate and, often, inconsistently applied. It will analyze, for
example, why it is unconstitutional to allow the courts to extend the
pretrial detention of defendants simply because they file pretrial
motions that contribute to the delay in getting their cases to trial.
It will conclude that because these tests do not effectively protect
the due process rights of detained defendants, there should be a
bright-line point at which pretrial detention is determined to be
unduly protracted, and therefore, punitive in all cases.
A. The Impact of the Bail Reform Act of 1984
In order to fully appreciate the profound impact of the Act, it
is first necessary to examine the number of individuals being detained
under the statute.8 6 In passing the Bail Reform Act of 1984, Con-
gress seriously underestimated the number of individuals who would
be detained pending trial.8 7 It is difficult to accurately ascertain the
total number of federal defendants detained pretrial because the
Administrative Office of the United States Courts does not maintain
this statistic. The Office does, however, maintain figures regarding
the total number of defendants against whom criminal cases are
filed and upon whom the Pretrial Services Agency (PSA) of the
183. 18 U.S.C. § 3142(e).
184. 481 U.S. 739 (1987).
185. Id. at 747 n.4.
186. Since the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of pretrial detention
in the Salerno case in May of 1987, only the statistics for the period from July 1,
1987 to June 30, 1988; July 1, 1988 to June 30, 1989; and July 1, 1989 to June 30,
1990 will be included herein.
187. In a May 24, 1983, letter from Alice M. Rivlin, Director of the Congressional
Budget Office to Senator Strom Thurmond, Chairman of the Senate Committee on
the Judiciary, the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) estimated the cost to the federal
government of implementing this law. The CBO assumed that the number of federal
defendants would continue at its recent average-about 44,000 per year and that
approximately 19 percent of this population would be affected by this bill. REPORT OF
THE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY ON S. 215, S. REP. No. 147, 98th Cong., 1st Sess.
65-66 (1983). Statistics derived from the annual reports of the Administrative Office
of the United States Courts for the years 1987, 1988 and 1990 strongly contradict this
estimate. See infra notes 205-215 and accompanying text.
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federal courts activates a case.' 88 The PSA gathers information used
by the federal courts to make decisions regarding the detention or
the release of defendants charged with federal offenses. 89 The num-
ber of criminal filings exceeds the number of PSA cases because the
total number of filings may include the names of an individual who
is named in more than one criminal filing'9 and because the PSA
figure only encompasses those defendants with whom the PSA has
had contact in an official capacity.' 9' Some defendants, for example,
choose not to be interviewed by the PSA. 92
The following table sets forth the total number of criminal
filings in federal court, the total number of PSA cases activated,
the total number and percentage of PSA cases where detention was
sought and ordered, as well as the total number, percentage and
reasons for this detention. It demonstrates that the total percentage
of the PSA-activated cases in which detention was sought rose
approximately five percent in the three-year period between July 1,
1987 through June 30, 1990. It also shows that detention was ordered
in three-fourths of the PSA-activated cases where detention was
sought, and that the total number of defendants detained in PSA-
activated cases increased by over four thousand in the three-year
period.
PRETRIAL DETENTION 1987-1990
Dates Total Crim. Pretrial Services Number of % of PSA Total Number of 176 of PSA
Defendants Agency (PSA)"' motions for activated cases defendants activated cases
Filed' cases activated detention filed by where detention detained in PSA where detention
govn't and court is sought activated cam ordered
in PSA cases
July 1, 1987 49,658 34,664 10,256 30 7,625 74
to
June 30, 19881"
July 1, 1988 51,307 41,562 13,815 33 10,249 74
to
June 30, 1989m
July 1, 1989 54,193 46,101 16,204 35 11,945 74
to
June 30, 1990"'
188. 1988-1990 ADMIN. OFFICE OF U.S. COURTS ANNUAL REPORT [hereinafter
ANNuAL REPORT].
189. 1988 ANNUAL REPORT 45.
190. 1990 ANNuAL REPORT 29.
191. Interview with Glen Vaughn, Chief Pretrial Services Officer, Southern
District of California (April 15, 1992).
192. Id.
193. This figure "includes persons proceeding by indictment, information or
consent on complaint and persons in fugitive status. It excludes petty, traffic, escapes
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REASONS FOR DETENTION
Flight Danger to Witnes Danger to Community Flight and Danger
Dates Total PSA Percent of Total PSA Pernet of Total PSA Perent of Total PSA Peroent of
Cases PSA Cases cases PSA Cases Cases PSA Cases Cases PSA Cases
July I, 1987 3,745 49 125 I 956 13 2,799 37
to
June 30, 1988
July I, 1988 4,647 45 139 1 1200 12 4,263 42
to
June 30, 1989
July 1, 1989 5,268 44 150 1 1503 13 5,024 42
to
June 30, 1990
B. The Evolution of a Due Process Test
The Bail Reform Act of 1984 was passed on October 12, 1984.98
Almost immediately after the passage of the Act, defendants detained
under the new legislation began to argue that not only the fact, but
the length, of their pretrial detention constituted punishment before
an adjudication of guilt, thereby violating their rights to substantive
due process.t9 To address this argument, courts first had to devise
a test to determine whether a period of pretrial detention passed
from permissible regulation to impermissible punishment.
From the time the courts first began to examine the question of
an allowable length of pretrial detention, they have rejected the use
[sic] reopens, removals and complaints dismissed at initial appearance." 1988 ANNUAL
REPORT 377 n.1; 1989 ANNUAL REPORT 375 n.1; 1990 ANNuAL REPORT 248 n.l.
194. A PSA case is activated on each criminal defendant who chooses to confer
with a pretrial services agent. "This column may include persons counted once as a
PSA case, but named in more than one criminal filing." 1988 ANNUAL REPORT 377
n.2; 1989 ANNUAL REPORT 375, n.2; 1990 ANcuAL REPORT 248 n.2.
195. 1988 ANNUAL REPORT at 374, 386 (all information for time period of 1987-
1988).
196. 1989 ANNuAL REPORT at 372, 384 (all information for time period 1988-
1989).
197. 1990 ANNUAL REPORT at 247, 253 (all information for time period of 1989-
1990). The 1990 Annual Report of the Proceedings of the Judicial Conference called
the state of pretrial detention a "crisis" and noted that "the average number of
defendants in. pretrial detention has more than doubled in the past four years." 1990
PROCEEDINGS OF THE JUDICIAL CoNF. ANNUAL REPORT 16.
198. See Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1985 (1984).
199. See, e.g., United States v. Infelise, 934 F.2d 103 (7th Cir. 1991); United
States v. Melendez-Carrion, 820 F.2d 56 (2d Cir. 1987); United States v. Accetturo,
783 F.2d 382 (3d Cir. 1986); United States v. Gotti, 776 F. Supp. 666 (E.D.N.Y.
1991); United States v. Gatto, 750 F. Supp. 664 (D.N.J. 1990); United States v.
Noriega, 746 F. Supp. 1548 (S.D. Fla. 1990);
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of any "per se" test. 2°° They have all agreed that because "due
process is a flexible concept, ' 20' the due process limit on the duration
of pretrial detention should be evaluated on a case-by-case basis. The
courts have avoided drawing any bright lines that determine "pre-
cisely when defendants adjudged to be flight risks or dangers to the
community should be released pending trial." 20 2 No court has "ex-
pressed a definitive view as to when a period of pretrial detention is
so excessive as to impinge on a defendant's due process rights. '203
All courts that have examined this issue, however, have agreed that
after the passage of some period of time, pretrial detention may pass
from permissible regulation to impermissible punishment. 2°4
The question arose as to what factors should be used to determine
if the length of detention had become unduly protracted and, there-
fore, punitive rather than regulatory. A description of the evolution
of the due process tests will demonstrate that, because the courts
received no guidance from either Congress or the Supreme Court as
to what factors should be considered in making this decision, the
courts' approach to this question was inconsistent and arbitrary. This
same flawed approach continues to be used today.
In one of the first cases to address the issue of a constitutionally
permissible length of pretrial detention, the Chief Judge of the
Eastern District of New York, Jack B. Weinstein, upheld the mag-
istrate's decision to release defendant Anthony Colombo on bail after
an initial detention order had resulted in Colombo's ninety-day
pretrial incarceration. 205 In deciding to uphold the magistrate's release
order, Judge Weinstein first relied on the statutory factors. 206 He
200. See, e.g., United States v. Berrios-Berrios, 791 F.2d 246 (2d Cir.) cert.
dismissed, 479 U.S. 978 (1986); United States v. Accetturo, 783 F.2d 382 (3d Cir.
1986); United States v. Theron, 782 F.2d 1510 (10th Cir. 1986); United States v. Portes,
786 F.2d 758 (7th Cir. 1985); United States v. Colombo, 777 F.2d 96 (2d Cir. 1985);
United States v. LoFranco, 620 F. Supp. 1324 (N.D.N.Y. 1985), app. dismissed sub
nom. United States v. Cheesman, 783 F.2d 38 (2nd Cir. 1986); United States v. Hall,
651 F. Supp. 13 (N.D.N.Y. 1985); United States v. Hazzard, 598 F. Supp. 1442, 1451
n.5 (N.D. Ill. 1984).
201. See, e.g., United States v. Accetturo, 783 F.2d 382, 388 (3d Cir. 1986).
202. Id.
203. United States v. Infelise, 1990 WL 77795 at *2 (N.D. Ill. May 15, 1990)
(memorandum opinion and order).
204. See, e.g., United States v. Infelise, 934 F.2d 103 (7th Cir. 1991); United
States v. Melendez-Carrion, 820 F.2d 56 (2d Cir. 1987); United States v. Accetturo,
783 F.2d 382 (3d Cir. 1986); United States v. Noriega, 746 F. Supp. 1548 (S.D. Fla.
1990); United States v. Gotti, 776 F. Supp. 666 (E.D.N.Y. 1991).
205. United States v. Colombo, 616 F. Supp. 780, 788 (E.D.N.Y.), rev'd 777
F.2d 96 (2d Cir. 1985).
206. Id. at 784. The Court is to examine:
(1) nature and circumstances of the offense charged, including whether the
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found that the Government had failed to establish by clear and
convincing evidence that detention was necessary because, in this
case, the court could devise bail conditions which would assure the
safety of the public.
20 7
Another significant reason for Judge Weinstein's decision was
that the defendant's trial was not likely to begin for another thirteen
to twenty-four months. 208 The judge reached this conclusion because
the indictment contained seventy-one counts, the charges were com-
plex, there were twenty-four other defendants in the case, and many
pretrial motions had been filed to which the Government had not
yet responded. 20 9 The judge recognized that Congress had excluded
the length of pretrial detention in the statutory list of factors the
court should use in determining whether to order the pretrial deten-
tion of a defendant. 210 He found, however, that it was necessary to
consider this factor because otherwise a defendant, in effect, would
"be sentenced to a long term of imprisonment on the theory that he
is guilty as charged, without affording him the due process of law
available at trial. ' ' 21' Consequently, he considered the likely length
of pretrial detention in determining whether the defendant should be
released or detained. 2 2 He found that the anticipated delay in bringing
Colombo to trial justified his release on bail.23
Three months later, while the defendant was still being detained,
the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed
Judge Weinstein's decision. 21 4 The court held that the conditions set
by the lower court were insufficient to assure that the defendant
would not pose a danger to the community. 25 More importantly, the
court concluded that the release of the defendant based on the
anticipated length of his pretrial incarceration was premature at that
time. 216 It thereby rejected the predominant factor used by the Chief
offense is a crime of violence or involves a narcotic drug;
(2) weight of the evidence against the person;
(3) the history and characteristics of the person ...
(4) the nature and seriousness of the danger to any person or the community
that would be posed by release.
18 U.S.C. § 3142(g) (1988).
207. Colombo, 616 F. Supp. at 785.
208. Id.
209. Id. at 786-87.
210. Id. at 784.
211. Id. at 786.
212. Id.
213. Id.
214. United States v. Colombo, 777 F.2d 96, 101 (2d Cir. 1985).
215. Id. at 99. "The particular danger that Columbo ... was found to pose-
that of an alleged supervisor and director of the 'Columbo Crew'-is hardly alleviated
by the type of conditions established by the district court." Id. at 100.
216. Id.
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Judge to determine the issue. Even though the defendant had already
been detained for seven months when the appellate court reviewed
the matter, the court found that, at this stage, the case did not
present the issue of whether the length of the defendant's pretrial
detention violated due process.217 Because the trial date was not yet
set and the court did not know who would cause any further delays
or what the reasons for the delays would be, it held it was premature
to determine that the defendant must be released to protect his due
process rights. The court conceded that the combined operation of
the Bail Reform Act and the Speedy Trial Act "might not work
perfectly well to protect against lengthy incarceration, ' 218 and in
"such a case, the length of a defendant's pretrial detention might
not survive a proper due process challenge. '219 Nonetheless it held
that this was not the case because the anticipated delay in trial was
merely speculative and Colombo had not moved to expedite his trial
or sever his case from that of his codefendants. 220 Consequently, the
Court would not find that the defendant's rights to due process had
been violated. 22'
Soon after Judge Weinstein rendered his decision in Colombo,22
the Chief Judge of the United States District Court for the Northern
District of New York, Howard Munson, examined the issue of
whether a defendant's six-month pretrial detention constituted a
violation of his due process rights. 223 In deciding that this period of
detention did violate the defendant's rights to due process, the court
used a balancing test, "[w]eighing the defendant's interest in liberty
against society's interest in his continued detention." ' 2 4 Although the
court found that the defendant did pose a risk of flight and potential
danger to the community, Judge Munson ruled that the defendant's
six-month pretrial incarceration up to that point and the likelihood
of future incarceration for at least three additional months before
trial outweighed those concerns. 225 Because the court had declared
217. Id. at 101.
218. Id. at 101. The court of appeals noted that Congress had relied on the
Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 3161-64 (1988), to limit the period of pretrial
incarceration but that in a complex case such as this, excludable time under 18 U.S.C.
§ 3161(h) such issues as: the filing and consideration of pretrial motions by both sides,
the scheduling difficulties of all parties and the delays in the interest of justice, would
substantially delay trial and would likely extend trial for detained defendants well
beyond the ninety days set forth in section 3164. Id.
219. Id. at 101.
220. Id.
221. Id.
222. 616 F. Supp. 780 (E.D.N.Y. 1985).
223. United States v. LoFranco, 620 F. Supp. 1324 (N.D.N.Y. 1985), appeal
dismissed sub nom. United States v. Cheesman, 783 F.2d 38 (2d Cir. 1986).
224. LoFranco, 620 F. Supp. at 1326.
225. Id.
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the case complex under the Speedy Trial Act, 226 this case was exempt
from the time requirements under that statute. Consequently, there
were no limitations on the amount of time this defendant could
spend in custody awaiting his trial. The court, therefore, found that
the defendant's rights to due process under the Fifth Amendment
had been violated.
Soon after, in January of 1986, defendants in the case of United
States v. Accetturo227 argued that the Bail Reform Act of 1984
violated due process because it failed to include any provision di-
recting the courts to consider the probable length of pretrial detention
when initially determining whether a defendant should be ordered
detained or released. 228 The United States Court of Appeals for the
Third Circuit rejected this argument. 229 It ruled that in relying on
the Speedy Trial Act 230 to govern the length of pretrial delay, Congress
had provided for a "rational scheme for limiting the duration of
federal pretrial detention. ' 23' The court found that because, at the
time of the initial detention hearing, the probable length of pretrial
detention and the responsibility for that delay was speculative, the
consideration of probable length of pretrial detention at that time
would be inappropriate. 232 It thereby rejected the concern that Judge
Weinstein had thought to be so critical.
The court did recognize, however, that pretrial detention could
not last indefinitely without resulting in a violation of due process. 233
Accordingly, the court fashioned a test enumerating the factors that
should be used at a hearing to determine whether the length of the
defendant's pretrial detention violated due process.2 14 Citing no au-
thority and relying on no statutory language or enunciated judicial
principles, the Third Circuit ruled that a court should consider the
factors relevant in the initial detention hearing "such as the serious-
ness of the charges, the strength of the government's proof that
defendant poses a risk of flight or a danger to the community, and
the strength of the government's case on the merits. ' 235 In addition,
the court ruled that such additional factors as "the length of the
detention that has in fact occurred, the complexity of the case, and
226. Id. at 1325. If a case is "unusual" or 'complex" the time limit provisions
of the Speedy Trial Act do not apply. See 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(8)(B)(ii) (1988).
227. 783 F.2d 382 (3d Cir. 1986).
228. Id. at 387.
229. Id.
230. 18 U.S.C. §§ 3161-3164 (1988).
231. Accetturo, 783 F.2d at 388.
232. Id.
233. Id. ("[Alt some point due process may require a release from pretrial
detention or, at a minimum, a fresh proceeding at which more is required of the
government than is mandated by section 3142 [of the Bail Reform Act].").
234. Id.
235. Id.
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whether the strategy of one side or the other has added needlessly
to that complexity" should be considered. 236 The Third Circuit did
not include in its formulation Judge Weinstein's major concern, the
likely length of future detention. Although the defendants in Accet-
turo had already been detained for three months and were not
scheduled for trial for an additional two months, 23 7 the court failed
to decide whether their due process rights had been violated by this
term of pretrial detention. 238
Several months later, in November of 1986, the United States
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit addressed the constitutional
challenge of appellants who argued that their fourteen-month pretrial
detention on the grounds of risk of flight violated their rights to due
process. 23 9 The Second Circuit, like the Third Circuit in Accetturo,240
recognized that at some point the length of pretrial detention raises
a constitutional issue and that each such challenge must be decided
on its own facts.24' 1 The court devised its own test to decide whether
the duration of pretrial detention violated due process. This test
considered the length of detention that the defendants had already
endured, the nonspeculative length of future detention, the extent of
the Government's responsibility for the pretrial delay, and the strength
of the evidence of the defendant's risk of flight, or danger to the
community when relevant.2 42 The Second Circuit, unlike the Third
Circuit, emphasized that the duration of the detention was a "central
focus of our inquiry. ' 243 At some point in time, irrespective of other
circumstances, the sheer length of pretrial detention would violate
due process. 2"
Also unlike the Third Circuit, the Second Circuit Court did not
find it necessary to revisit such issues as the seriousness of the charges
or the strength of the Government's case on the merits to determine
whether the length of the defendant's pretrial incarceration violated
236. Id.
237. Id. at 387.
238. Accetturo is particularly noteworthy on the issue of pretrial detention. Some
of the defendants in this case were held in pretrial detention for an extended period
of time and after a twenty-one month jury trial, all twenty defendants were acquitted
of all charges. See Terrance G. Reed, The Defense Case for RICO Reform, 43 VAD.
L. REV. 691, 719 (1990).
239. United States v. Gonzales-Claudio, 806 F.2d 334, 335 (2d Cir. 1986).
240. 783 F.2d 382 (3d Cir. 1986).
241. Gonzales-Claudio, 806 F.2d at 340.
242. Id. at 340-41.
243. Id. at 340. The court also noted the importance of considering the prose-
cution's role in the trial delay and the strength of the evidence indicating risk of flight.
Id.
244. Id. However, the court stated that "in most cases likely to be encountered
it is more consonant with due process jurisprudence to consider factors in addition to
passage of time." Id.
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due process. Instead, the court was much more concerned with the
status of the case at the -time of the due process challenge. It
considered how long the pretrial detention of the defendant had
already lasted, how much longer it was scheduled to last, to what
extent the Government bore responsibility for the pretrial delay, and
whether the facts that supported initial pretrial detention on the basis
of risk of flight (or danger to the community, when relevant) were
constitutionally sufficient to extend the detention. 24
The Second Circuit found that the fourteen-month pretrial con-
finement, with the certainty of at least another twelve months to the
end of trial, militated in favor of a violation of due process. 246 Added
to that was the Government's responsibility for a significant portion
of the delay due to its dilatory tactics in providing the defense with
discovery such as certified translations of audiotapes and video-
tapes. 247 The court concluded that although the district court was not
clearly erroneous in its finding that the defendants posed a risk of
flight, in view of the protracted length of the pretrial detention, the
facts regarding flight were insufficient to permit continued detention
of the defendants. 248
At almost exactly the same time, in United States v. Gallo,249
Chief Judge Weinstein was again examining the constitutionality of
prolonged pretrial detention in a case where defendants had been
incarcerated for almost five months on the grounds that they posed
a danger to a Government witness. 20 The Chief Judge opined that
assessing whether or not a defendant's rights to due process had
been denied was a "delicate and complex" matter. 25 ' He concluded
that a decision regarding the release of a defendant should be left
to the discretion of the trial court because as the factfinder on the
issues of risk of flight and danger to the community, it was in the
best position to determine whether release or detention was appro-
priate .252
Judge Weinstein found that the statutory factors set forth in the
Bail Reform Act of 1984 for an initial determination regarding release
or detention of the defendant would have to be reconsidered at the
time of a due process challenge by the defendant. 253 In addition, he
245. Id.
246. Id. at 343. "[Tjhe Due Process Clause endeavors to set outer limits at which
risks to society must be accepted to avoid unconscionable deprivations of the liberty
of individuals." Id.
247. Id. at 342.
248. Id. at 343.
249. United States v. Gallo, 653 F. Supp 320 (E.D.N.Y. 1986).
250. Id.
251. Id. at 338.
252. Id. at 339-40.
253. Id. at 344. Section 3142(g) of the Bail Reform Act requires that the court
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agreed with the Third Circuit 254 that the court must consider who is
responsible for the delay in proceeding to trial and whether the delay
is reasonable under the circumstances. 2"1 Maintaining the position he
set out in United States v. Columbo,216 the Chief Judge reiterated
that the length of both pretrial detention to the point of the due
process challenge as well as the nonspeculative future detention should
be considered in assessing whether a violation of due process had
occurred.257
Judge Weinstein went further, however, and stated that the court
should consider not only the length but also the hardships caused by
the detention. 258 The Chief Judge stated that the court must take
into account the detrimental effects of lengthy detention on the
defendant. 25 9 He noted that protracted incarceration causes financial
difficulties for the defendant who is forced into unemployment, 260
deterioration of the defendant's morale and demeanor due to isolation
from family and friends, interaction with those already convicted of
crimes, 261 and the devolution of the defendant's legal defense due to
an inability to assist the attorney full-time in the investigation and
preparation of his case. 262 The court recognized that the harsh effects
of custody must also be considered when deciding whether the
detention has passed from regulation to punishment. 263 Up until that
time, no court had ever addressed these concerns when deciding this
issue. In resolving whether the period of pretrial detention constituted
punishment, the courts had considered the amount of time the
defendant spent in pretrial custody, but no court had weighed the
effects that this incarceration had on the defendant.
The Chief Judge also stated that once the defendant has been
detained for a substantial period of time, the court must carefully
consider the following in determining whether to detain or release the defendant: 1)
the nature and circumstances of the offense charged, including whether the offense is
a crime of violence; 2) the weight of the evidence against the defendants, 3) the history
and characteristics of the defendants, and 4) the nature and seriousness of the danger
to the witness that would be posed by the person's release. 18 U.S.C. § 3142(g) (1988).
254. See United States v. Accetturo, 783 F.2d 382 (3d Cir. 1986).
255. Gallo, 653 F. Supp. at 343.
256. 616 F. Supp. 780 (E.D.N.Y. 1985).
257. Id. at 344.
258. Id. at 336-38.
259. Id. at 338.
260. Id. at 337.
261. Id. at 336. The Bail Reform Act requires that those ordered detained be
housed in a place of commitment "separate, to the extent practicable, from persons
awaiting or serving sentences or being held in custody pending appeal." 18 U.S.C.
§ 3142(i)(2)(1988). Many detainees, however, are held in the very same facility as
individuals who have already been convicted of crimes and are awaiting or serving
their sentences. Gallo, 653 F. Supp. at 336, 344.
262. Id. at 337.
263. Id. at 338.
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re-evaluate any alternatives to pretrial incarceration to determine
whether any such conditions may be imposed on the defendant that
would effectively, but not so restrictively, deal with the threat he
poses. 264 Even though the statute required courts to impose detention
only when no conditions of release would reasonably assure against
the risk of flight or danger to the community, no other court included
this concern in the calculus that was to be used to determine if
pretrial detention had crossed the line from constitutional to uncon-
stitutional.
In this case, the Chief Judge weighed the length of detention,
the effects of such detention on the defendants, the nonspeculative
length of future detention, the responsibility for the delay, the
reasonableness of the delay, the nature of the offense, the weight of
the evidence against the defendants, the history and characteristics
of the defendants, the nature and seriousness of the danger the
defendants presented if released, and options other than incarcera-
tion. Judge Weinstein decided that the release of the Gallo defendants
was constitutionally required. 265
The cases that followed failed to adopt the test set forth by Judge
Weinstein. Specifically they did not consider the effects of pretrial
incarceration on the accused. Instead they relied on the tests set forth
in United States v. Accetturo266 or United States v. Gonzales-Clau-
dio. 267
264. Id.
265. Id. at 345.
266. 783 F.2d 382 (3d Cir. 1986). The test set forth in Accetturo, considers the
seriousness of the charges, the strength of the Government's proof that the defendant
poses a risk of flight or danger to the community, the strength of the Government's
case on the merits, the length of the detention which has in fact occurred, the complexity
of the case and whether the strategy of one side or the other has added needlessly to
that complexity. Id. at 388. See, e.g., United States v. Infelise, 934 F.2d 103 (7th Cir.
1991); United States v. Gotti, 776 F. Supp. 666 (E.D.N.Y. 1991); United States v.
Noriega, 746 F. Supp 1548 (S.D. Fla. 1990); United States v. Gatto, 750 F. Supp. 664
(D.N.J. 1990); United States v. Renzulli, No. 87-258-7, 1987 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8750,
(E.D. Penn. Sept. 28, 1987) (memorandum and order).
267. 806 F.2d 334 (2d Cir. 1986). The test set forth in Gonzales-Claudio considers
the length of the detention that the defendants have thus far endured, the non-
speculative length of future detention, the extent of the Government's responsibility
for the pretrial delay and the strength of the evidence of the defendant's risk of flight
or danger to the community. Id. at 340. See, e.g., United States v. Quatermaine, 913
F.2d 910 (11th Cir. 1990); United States v. Gelfuso, 838 F.2d 359 (9th Cir. 1988)
(streamlining the Gonzales-Claudio test to include only the length of the detention and
the extent to which the Government was responsible for the delay); United States v.
Ojeda Rios, 846 F.2d 167 (2d Cir. 1988); United States v. Melendez-Carrion, 820 F.2d
56 (2d Cir. 1987); United States v. Jackson, 823 F.2d 4 (2d Cir. 1987); United States
v. Whitehorn, No. 88-0145, 1989 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6460 (D.C. Cir. June 8, 1989)
(memorandum and order); United States v. Martinez, 678 F. Supp. 267 (S.D. Fla.
1988).
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C. Problems with the Due Process Test
There are serious flaws with the flexible test currently used by
the courts to determine whether pretrial detention has crossed the
line from permissible regulation to impermissible punishment. These
flaws include placing the onus on the defendant to bring the issue
of a due process violation to the attention of the court and finding
the defendant responsible for extending his detention when he exer-
cises his right to litigate constitutional issues by filing pretrial mo-
tions.
The current tests place the onus on the defendant to continuously
raise the issue of the denial of due process rights. This burden
remains on the defendant until the court either recognizes that the
defendant's rights to due process have been violated and releases him
from custody or resolves the case. With no guidance from the Bail
Reform Act and no indication from the Supreme Court as to when
pretrial detention becomes unduly protracted, the defendant must
speculate as to when the court will be prepared to grant his motion
for release based on a denial of due process rights. 268 If such
speculation is wrong and the court does not believe that the defen-
dant's term of pretrial incarceration has been long enough, the
defendant must continue to file motions seeking release. This process
continues until the court orders the defendant released or the case
ends. 269 The process involves a substantial investment of resources by
the defense attorney, who must continuously prepare and file such
motions, by the prosecutor, who must continuously respond to these
motions, and by the court,which must continuously review, hear,
and decide these motions. 270
It also extends the length of time of pretrial detention. Every
time a defendant files a motion, the period of time from the filing
of the motion until its resolution by the court is excluded from the
268. Alschuler, supra note 12, at 517 n.30.
269. Id. "[T]he effective representation of a detained defendant apparently would
require his lawyer to appear before a judge at periodic intervals to ask, 'Now?' After
an unspecified number of months during which the judge would reply, 'Not yet,' he
would answer, 'Yes, now.' " Id. See, e.g., United States v. Portes, 786 F.2d 758, 768,
n. 14 (7th Cir. 1986) (The Seventh Circuit found defendant's four and one-half month
detention did not rise to the level of a due process violation, but invited the defendant
to "at any time request that the district court reconsider the detention order." The
court would "express no opinion as to the length of detention which would be
constitutionally impermissible"); United States v. Infelise, No. 90-CR-87, 1990 WL
77795 (N.D.Ill. May 15, 1990) (memorandum opinion and order) (the court found the
defendants' three month detention did not constitute a violation of due process but
recommended "that if at a later date defendants can more definitively show that their
pretrial detention is no longer regulatory but instead has become punitive, they should
bring a motion for reconsideration.")
270. Eason, supra note 12 at 1076.
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time requirements of the Speedy Trial Act. 27' The trial date can,
therefore, be scheduled for a date further in the future. 27 Although
Congress chose to rely on the Speedy Trial Act to guarantee a
defendant's limited pretrial incarceration, in practice under that very
statute, each time a defendant asks the court to consider whether
the length of pretrial detention has become unduly protracted, the
detention may grow longer and the trial date may become even more
distant.
The current system also creates problems for the defendant who
waits a significant period of time before filing such a motion for
pretrial release because he believes that he must endure a substantial
period of time in pretrial detention before approaching the court for
release. When his motion is heard, he learns that the court will grant
his request for release, and based on the court's assessment of the
factors involved, would likely have granted the request several months
earlier.2 73 The denial of the defendant's due process rights is irre-
versible, however, and the only remedy at that point is release from
custody on conditions. There is no compensation for the period of
time the defendant has spent in pretrial custody past the point of a
due process violation. 274
271. See 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(1)(F) (1988). This section states:
(h) The following periods of delay shall be excluded in computing the time
within which an information or an indictment must be filed or in com-
puting the time within which the trial of any such offense must commence:
(1) Any period of delay resulting from other proceedings concerning the
defendant, including, but not limited to-
(F) delay resulting from an pretrial motion, from the filing of the
motion through the conclusion of the hearing on, or other prompt
disposition of, such motion.
Id.
272. See, e.g., United States v. Mendoza, 663 F. Supp. 1043, 1047-48 (D.N.J.
1987). In Mendoza the court noted "[i]f the accused exercises his constitutional rights
by filing pre-trial motions, he thus extends his period of pre-trial incarceration. This is
so even if he is successful on said motions." Id.
273. Alschuler, supra note 12, at 516-17 n.30. "Just when the preventive tadpole
would become a punitive bullfrog seems to be anyone's guess." Id.
274. Interestingly, when a subcommittee of the House Committee on the District
of Columbia, held hearings on the bill authorizing pretrial detention in the District of
Columbia, Subcommittee Chairman John Dowdy proposed a provision that would
compensate a defendant wrongfully detained at the rate of twenty dollars per day. Bail
Reforms, Stop and Search, Pretrial Detention, Crimes of Violence, and Juvenile Code:
Hearings on H.R. 14334 Before the Subcomm. of the Comm. on the District of
Columbia House of Representatives 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969) microformed on CIS
No. H301.2 at 73 (Congressional Info. Serv.) (statement of John Dowdy, Chairman,
Subcomm. No. 3). "My Bail Reform Bill [H.R. 128551 has one unique feature that
none of the others has, and that is it would provide a $20 per day allowance to a
defendant wrongfully detained. One who is eventually exonerated would be compensated
for the time that his liberty was denied him." Id. Neither the final version of the
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The courts also have expressed different views on the element of
length of the detention of the defendant. Although the amount of
time the defendant has spent in pretrial custody would seem to be
an objective factor, it is often evaluated in a subjective light. While
some courts consider a relatively short period of custody before an
adjudication of guilt to be onerous, 275 other courts view a substantially
longer period of detention to be an acceptable consequence of being
accused of a serious crime and being found to be a flight risk or
danger to the community.27 6 It is true that when courts make these
due process judgements, they view a number of factors in conjunction
with each other. If one court begins, however, with the position that
pretrial detention of eight or ten months is not particularly onerous,
while another court views detention of four months as unduly bur-
densome, then the final answer to the question of whether the period
of pretrial detention has passed from permissible regulation to im-
permissible punishment will differ significantly from court to court. 277
Furthermore, not all courts allocate the same weight to the factor
of length of detention. While some courts believe that the length of
pretrial detention is the determinative factor in the calculus used to
decide whether the defendant's due process rights have been vio-
lated,278 other courts see it as only one of several elements they must
consider. 279 This lack of uniformity results in disparate treatment for
individuals charged with federal offenses .280 While defendants are
asserting their right to due process under the Fifth Amendment, the
District of Columbia bail reform legislation nor the federal Bail Reform Act of 1984
includes such a provision. Commentators have suggested that such a provision would
compel the Government to be accountable for unwarranted detention. See Marc Miller
& Martin Guggenheim, Pretrial Detention and Punishment, 75 MINN. L. REv. 335,
411 (1990).
275. See, e.g., United States v. Vastola, 652 F. Supp. 1446, 1448 (D.N.J. 1987)
(the defendants' three and one-half month detention plus the likelihood of extended
future detention required immediate release); United States v. Galo, 653 F. Supp. 320
(E.D.N.Y. 1986) (the four and one-half months the defendants spent in pretrial custody
along with the probability of much longer incarceration warranted the defendants'
immediate release with stringent conditions).
276. See, e.g., United States v. Quatermaine, 913 F.2d 910, 918 (11th Cir. 1990)
("the prospect of eight to ten months of pretrial detention, without more, does not
mandate the release of a defendant for whom pretrial detention is otherwise appropri-
ate"); United States v. Tortora, 922 F.2d 880, 889 (1st Cir. 1990) (defendant's more
than six month pretrial detention "has not been so protracted as to support a due
process claim"); United States v. Melendez-Carrion, 820 F.2d 56, 59-60 (2d Cir. 1987)
(defendants' nineteen-month detention was not a per se violation of due process).
277. See supra notes 275-76.
278. See, e.g., United States v. Galo, 653 F. Supp. 320 (E.D.N.Y. 1986); United
States v. LoFranco, 620 F. Supp. 1324 (N.D.N.Y. 1985), appeal dismissed sub nom.
United States v. Cheesman, 783 F.2d 38 (2d Cir. 1986)
279. See, e.g., United States v. Melendez-Carrion, 820 F.2d 56 (2d Cir. 1987);
United States v. Zannino, 798 F.2d 544, 547-48 (1st Cir. 1986).
280. Eason, supra note 12, at 1075.
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resolution of their claims seems to depend upon the district or even
the judge hearing their motions. 28 ' The courts have enormous discre-
tion in making these judgments. Often this discretion results in
disparate treatment for those accused of federal offenses in federal
courts .282
Another problem is the way in which courts assess responsibility
for the delay in getting the case to trial. Generally, the courts examine
the record of the case proceedings and try to ascertain if either the
prosecution or the defense has acted in any way to complicate or
delay the case. In some cases, courts have found that defendants
who file extensive pretrial motions are responsible for prolonging
their own detention. 283
Charging a defendant with the responsibility for delaying the trial
and extending his detention due to his filing of pretrial motions
creates an intolerable dilemma for the defendant. For example, if he
files a pretrial motion to suppress evidence or obtain discovery, his
pretrial detention is extended, and he may be held responsible for
this extension. 28 The alternative is to abandon all claims to exclude
or obtain evidence in an effort to limit pretrial incarceration. This
result forces the defendant to choose between the exercise of two
constitutional rights-the litigation of constitutional claims under the
Fourth, Fifth and Sixth Amendments versus the Fifth Amendment
right not to be punished before an adjudication of guilt by a
prolonged period of pretrial incarceration. 28 5 The Supreme Court has
281. See id. at 1076.
282. Id. at 1075.
283. See, e.g., United States v. Infelise, 934 F.2d 103, 105 (7th Cir. 1991) (sixteen-
month pretrial incarceration did not violate due process because "the length and depth
of their [the defendants'] preparation" can not be used to gain their release from
pretrial detention); United States v. Ojeda Rios, 846 F.2d 167, 169 (2d Cir. 1988)
(thirty-two month pretrial detention could no longer withstand a due process challenge,
but that this substantial delay was largely due to the "zealous, perhaps overly zealous,
pretrial demands of the defendants"); United States v. Berrios-Berrios, 791 F.2d 246,
253 (2d Cir. 1986) (the complexity of the case, "exacerbated by the defendants' many
motions," did not render eight-month pretrial detention unconstitutional); United States
v. Gonzales-Claudio, 806 F.2d 334, 341 (2d Cir. 1986) (court found fourteen-month
pretrial detention did violate due process but commented that "defendants cannot
litigate pretrial matters to the ultimate degree and then rely on the extra time attributable
to their motion practice to claim that the duration of pretrial detention violates due
process").
284. See 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(1)(F) (1988). Under the Speedy Trial Act, any delay
resulting from the filing of a pretrial motion through the conclusion of the hearing
on, or other prompt disposition of, such motion is excluded in the computation of
time within which the defendant's trial must take place. Id. Furthermore, after a
hearing on the motions, the court may take the matter under advisement for a period
of up to thirty days. See 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(1)(J) (1988).
285. See, e.g., United States v. Mendoza, 663 F. Supp. 1043, 1047-48 (D.N.J.
1987). The Court stated:
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held that it will not tolerate a government action which compels a
defendant to choose between the exercise of two constitutional rights.2
If the accused exercises his constitutional rights by filing pre-trial motions, he
thus extends his period of pre-trial incarceration. This is so even if he is
successful on said motions. On the other hand, if he forgoes those motions,
he accelerates his trial date, but thereby relinquishes valuable rights and
defenses. The chilling effect is obvious.
Id.
286. See Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377, 394 (1968). In Simmons,
pursuant to the Fourth Amendment, one of the defendants moved to suppress a suitcase
that contained incriminating evidence. Id. at 381. In support of this motion, the
defendant testified on the issue of standing at the pretrial hearing. The motion was
ultimately denied and the Government used the defendant's pretrial testimony as
evidence against him during its case-in-chief. Id. The Supreme Court recognized that
this created a "dilemma" for the defendant, because by pursuing a Fourth Amendment
motion to suppress evidence and providing the necessary information regarding standing
through his own testimony, the- defendant was required to incriminate himself in
violation of his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. Id. at 391. The
Court acknowledged that by allowing the defendant's pretrial testimony to be used
against him on the issue of guilt at trial, the court was forcing the defendant to make
a choice between either litigating his Fourth Amendment claims and incriminating
himself in violation of his Fifth Amendment privilege, or remaining silent and aban-
doning his rights under the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 393. The Court found it
"intolerable that one constitutional right should have to be surrendered in order to
assert another." Id. at 399. The Supreme Court held that when a defendant testifies
in support of his motion to suppress evidence pursuant to the Fourth Amendment, his
pretrial testimony can not later be used against him as evidence of guilt during the
Government's case-in-chief, in violation of his Fifth Amendment right to remain silent.
Id.
The principle set forth in Simmons was reaffirmed in United States v. Salvucci.
See United States v. Salvucci, 448 U.S. 83 (1980). Other courts have addressed the
problem of compelling a defendant to choose between the exercise of two constitutional
rights and have found this compulsion to be unacceptable. See, e.g., United States v.
Inmon, 568 F.2d 326 (3d Cir. 1977) (testimony at pretrial hearing as to whether second
indictment charged same offense for which he had already been placed in jeopardy
could not be used at trial because doing so would force defendant to choose between
the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination and the Fifth Amendment
double jeopardy claim); United States v. Branker, 418 F.2d 378 (2d Cir. 1969)
(Government was not permitted to use defendant's testimony during a hearing to
determine indigence for the purpose of seeking appointed counsel, against him at trial
because doing so would compel the defendant to choose between his Sixth Amendment
right to counsel and his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination). But see,
McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 212, 213 (1971), vacated on other grounds, 408 U.S.
941 (1972). In McGautha the Supreme Court distinguished Simmons and stated:
The criminal process, like the rest of the legal system is replete with situations
requiring the 'making of difficult judgments' as to which course to follow.
Although a defendant may have a right, even of constitutional dimensions,
to follow which ever course he chooses, the Constitution does not by that
token always forbid requiring him to choose. The threshold question is whether
compelling the election impairs to an appreciable extent any of the policies
behind the rights involved.
Id. at 183 (emphasis added) (citation omitted). See also Peter Westen, Incredible
Dilemmas: Conditioning One Constitutional Right on the Forfeiture of Another, 66
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Significantly, two weeks before the passage of the District of
Columbia Bail Reform legislation that served as a prototype for the
Bail Reform Act of 1984, Congress specifically added language to
that statute to make it clear that the defendant's filing of motions,
other than a motion for continuance, would not be used to extend
pretrial detention. 287 Fourteen years later when Congress passed the
federal bail legislation, it included no such language in the Act.288
An additional difficulty emerges when one detained defendant
files few or no motions while a codefendant files extensive and
complicated motions. Under the Speedy Trial Act, a "reasonable
period of delay when the defendant is joined for trial with a code-
fendant as to whom the time for trial has not run and no motion
for severance has been granted" is excludable. 2 9 Consequently, the
delay attributable to one defendant for the filing of pretrial motions
is attributable to all defendants in the case, even if they have not
joined in those motions. 290 The only requirement is that the delay be
"reasonable." 29' As a result, a defendant who has not acted in any
way to delay trial, who has repeatedly requested a severance from
the other codefendants, who has filed few, if any, motions, and who
has at all times requested an immediate trial, may still be detained
for a substantial period of time.292
Finally, the courts find no constitutional violation when they
conclude that defendants are responsible for prolonging their own
IOWA L. REv. 741 (1981); William R. Stein, Note, Resolving Tensions Between
Constitutional Rights: Use Immunity In Concurrent or Related Proceedings, 76 CoLuM.
L. REV. 674 (1976).
287. D.C. CODE ANN. § 23-1322(d)(1) (1989). See also supra note 80 and
accompanying text.
288. For a discussion regarding the reasons why Congress did not include any
such time limitations, see supra notes 95-108 and accompanying text.
289. 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7) (1988).
290. United States v. Piteo, 726 F.2d 53 (2d Cir. 1984); United States v. Campbell,
706 F.2d 1138, 1141 (l1th Cir. 1983); United States v. Novak, 715 F.2d 810, 815 (3d
Cir. 1983) cert. denied 465 U.S. 1030 (1983); United States v. Noriega, 746 F. Supp.
1548, 1559 (S.D. Fla. 1990).
291. Noriega, 746 F. Supp. at 1559.
292. See, e.g., Noriega, 746 F. Supp. at 1548. The court found that despite
defendant Saldarriaga's twelve-month pretrial detention, the four additional months
until the scheduled trial date, his lack of responsibility for the delay, his repeated
efforts to sever his case from that of codefendant Noriega, his one-year pretrial
incarceration did not violate due process. The court reasoned that the defendant posed
a significant flight risk while facing very serious charges, and the Government was not
responsible for the delay, even though it repeatedly opposed the defendant's motion
for severance. Id. at 1561-62. But see United States v. Theron, 782 F.2d 1510 (10th
Cir. 1986). In Theron the court held that after four and one-half months pretrial
incarceration, due process demanded that the defendant either be released on bond or
be tried within thirty days because he had repeatedly sought an immediate trial, and
the delays were attributable to the filing of motions by his codefendants. Id. at 1516-
17.
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pretrial detention by requesting additional time to prepare for trial,
irrespective of whether the case encompasses a lengthy pre-indictment
investigation, multiple charges or numerous defendants. For example,
in United States v. Infelise,293 the United States Court of Appeals
for the Seventh Circuit held that defendants' pretrial detention of
approximately fifteen months did not violate due process because the
defense, not the Government, was responsible for the delay in bring-
ing the case to trial. 294
The Seventh Circuit reached this decision despite the fact that
this was a complex case in which the Government filed an indictment
charging twenty defendants with forty-two separate counts. During
the course of its investigation, the Government had amassed approx-
imately 1000 hours of electronic surveillance of the defendants and
voluminous betting and loan records. In addition, the Government
had applied for and obtained authorization for Title III wiretaps and
several search warrants. In preparing their defense, the defendants
sought to review all this discovery. 295
By holding the defendants entirely responsible for the pretrial
delay, the court ignores the role of the Government in any criminal
case. The Government controls the investigation. It decides how
many charges to file and what those charges should be. It decides
how many defendants to charge and whether those charges should
be contained in one or several separate indictments. It decides whether
and what discovery should be released without the filing of pretrial
motions. Moreover, the prosecution can oppose continuances and
move for severance of counts or defendants. The Government must,
therefore, bear at least some of the responsibility when a complex
case does not get to trial expeditiously. 296
293. 934 F.2d 103 (7th Cir. 1991).
294. Id. at 1104-05. The Infelise court stated:
[T]he extent of delay is to some extent within the control of the defendants
themselves, and they cannot be allowed to manufacture the grounds for their
constitutional argument.... The delay appears to be due to the time that
the defendants' counsel are taking to prepare their clients' defense. Of course,
we do not criticize them for preparing as carefully as possible, but neither do
we think that the length or depth of their preparation can obtain the release
of defendants whose dangerousness has been amply demonstrated.
Id. See also United States v. Gelfuso, 738 F.2d 358, 359 (9th Cir. 1988); United States
v. Jackson, 823 F.2d 4, 7 (2d Cir. 1987); United States v. Melendez-Carrion, 820 F.2d
56, 60 (2d Cir. 1987); United States v. Gotti, 776 F. Supp. 666, 671 (E.D.N.Y. 1991).
295. United States v. Infelise, No. 90-CR-87, 1990 WL 77795 (N.D. Ill. May 15,
1990) (memorandum opinion and order). On March 4, 1991, defendants filed thirty-
three separate pretrial motions. United States v. Infelise, No. 90-CR-87, 1991 LEXIS
10220 at *1 (N.D.Ill. July 12, 1991) (memorandum opinion and order). On July 12,
1991, the court rendered its decision on these motions. Id. The time period from the
filing of the pretrial motions until the rendering of the decision by the district court
was all excludable under the Speedy Trial Act. See 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(1)(F)(1988).
296. See United States v. Salerno, 794 F.2d 64, 79 n.2 (2d Cir. 1986), reversed
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By finding that even in complex cases the defendants are entirely
responsible for the pretrial delay, the courts compel these defendants
to choose between either preparing for trial and extending their
pretrial detention or foregoing the preparation and reducing their
pretrial detention. Again this forces the defendant to choose between
constitutional rights-the right to a fair trial and the right not to be
punished before trial, both under the Fifth Amendment. If the
defendant chooses the right to a fair trial through a thorough
preparation that requires some time, then the courts will not find
that the extended pretrial detention constitutes a denial of due
process. The courts thus force the defendant to endure an extended
period of pretrial incarceration because the defendant has sought to
thoroughly prepare a defense to obtain a fair trial.297
481 U.S. 739 (1987). As Chief Judge Feinberg noted in his dissent:
Pretrial detention under any circumstances is an extraordinary remedy with
serious due process implications. If the Government seeks the benefit of that
remedy it must exert itself to accelerate the date for a trial. Quite often,
reliance on the usual processes of trial administration will not be -enough. If
this is so, the Government must take whatever special steps are needed to
move the trial date forward. In complex, multi-defendant cases, that may
require that the Government seek a severance. In cases involving many hours
of taped intercepted material, the Government may have to arrange for swift
and reliable transcription, by extraordinary means if necessary, before moving
for detention or immediately after obtaining it. Should the Government be
unwilling or unable to shoulder the cost of these procedures, pretrial detention
may not be available.
Id. (emphasis added). See also United States v. Vastola, 652 F. Supp. 1446, 1448
(D.N.J. 1987). In Vastola the district court ordered the defendants released from pretrial
detention because upon initial detention of the defendants, the Government first
estimated its evidence to contain approximately 1000 hours of audio tape which defense
counsel would need to review before trial, but later agreed that there were actually
3000 to 3800 hours of tape recordings. Id. The Government did not facilitate the
review of the tapes by providing an index of the contents of those tapes. Id. In United
States v. Gatto, the district court ordered the release of the detained defendants because,
after successfully moving for the pretrial detention of the defendants on the ground of
dangerousness, fourteen months later the Government first disclosed to defense counsel
that it had amassed fifteen years worth of surveillance logs on the detained defendants
which the defense would have to review. United States v. Gatto, 750 F. Supp. 664,
671 (D.N.J. 1990).
297. See United States v. Infelise, No. 90-CR-87, 1990 WL 77795 (N.D.Ill. May
15, 1990) (memorandum opinion and order). In Infelise, the defense argued that the
pretrial incarceration of the defendants would serve to prolong the period needed to
review discovery and prepare for trial because access to those detained was restricted.
Id. at *2. The court rejected this contention as well. Id. at *4. On October 15, 1991,
after a period of twenty months of pretrial custody, the court again denied defendants'
motion for limited release. See also United States v. Infelise, No 90-CR-87, 1991
LEXIS 17111 (N.D.III. October 15, 1991) (memorandum opinion and order). The
defendants had sought release for the period of their trial in order to have more time
to meet with counsel. Id. at *1. They had proposed that they be fitted with electronic
ankle bracelets which would monitor their whereabouts twenty-four hours per day.
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IV. PROPOSALS FOR CHANGE
The statistics and cases on pretrial detention clearly show that
pretrial detention has become a common phenomenon in federal
criminal cases29 and that congressional reliance on the Speedy Trial
Act 29 to limit the length of pretrial detention was misplaced.3'0 It
appears that having a case of a detained defendant proceed to trial
within ninety days is the exception rather than the rule. Many
defendants have spent protracted periods of time in custody awaiting
their trials.3°' Furthermore, there are significant problems with the
way in which the courts now determine whether the period of pretrial
detention has become punitive rather than regulatory. To address
these problems, the federal Bail Reform Act must be amended.
The most dramatic and uniform solution to the problems set
forth in this Article would be to amend the Bail Reform Act to
strictly limit the period of pretrial detention.302 Congress should
follow the lead of the District of Columbia bail statute and amend
the Act to limit pretrial detention to a maximum period of ninety
days. 303 This amendment would read as follows:
Although the court was sensitive to the difficulties the defendants faced in trying to
confer privately and extensively with their attorneys while incarcerated, the court found
that these difficulties did not constitute a violation of the defendants' Sixth Amendment
right to effective assistance of counsel. Id. As of February 13, 1992, two years after
the defendants had been ordered detained, the trial of this case was in progress and
the defendants were still detained. United States v. Infelise, No. 90-CR-87, 1992 LEXIS
2746 (N.D.III. February 13, 1992) (memorandum opinion and order).
See also United States v. DiGiacomo, 746 F. Supp. 1176, 1182 (D. Mass. 1990)
(regarding defendant's Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel). In
DiGiacomo the court noted that the defendants were being incarcerated before trial
approximately four hours away from the courthouse and the offices of their attorneys.
The court recognized that "[alt some point a serious question concerning whether the
defendants are being denied their right to effective counsel might be generated by
problems relating to the place or manner of their pretrial detention." Id. However,
the court stated that it was "not now presented with this constitutional question." Id.
298. See supra notes 95-108 and accompanying text.
299. 18 U.S.C. §§ 3161, 3164 (1988).
300. See supra notes 95-108 and accompanying text (discussing Congress' decision
to rely on the Speedy Trial Act to limit the length of pretrial detention).
301. See, e.g., United States v. Infelise, 934 F.2d 103, 104 (7th Cir. 1991); United
States v. Gelfuso, 838 F.2d 358, 359 (9th Cir. 1988); United States v. Ojeda Rios, 846
F.2d 167, 168 (2d Cir. 1988); United States v. Gotti, 776 F. Supp. 666, 670 (E.D.N.Y.
1991); United States v. Noriega, 746 F. Supp. 1548, 1561 (S.D. Fla. 1990).
302. See, e.g., D.C. CODE ANN. § 23-1322(d)(4) (1989). Others have also advo-
cated a bright-line test to determine whether a period of pretrial detention violates due
process. See, e.g., Alschuler, supra note 12, at 510; Applbaum, supra note 95, at 1090;
Eason, supra note 12, at 1077; Miller & Guggenheim, supra note 274, at 412; Price,
supra note 135.
303. See, e.g., D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 23-1322(d)(l)-(4) (1989); see also WIs. STAT.
ANN. § 969.035(8) (1985). The defendant "shall be released from custody with or
without conditions" if the period of detention exceeds sixty days from the date of the
pretrial hearing. Id.
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A defendant shall be entitled to release on conditions pursuant
to 18 U.S.C. § 3142 upon the expiration of sixty calendar days,
unless the trial is in progress or the trial has been delayed at the
request of the defendant, other than by the filing of timely motions.
This period of pretrial detention may be extended for a period of
up to thirty days, upon a showing of good cause by the prosecutor,
but only for the additional time required to prepare for the expedited
trial of a detained defendant.) 4
This amendment would limit pretrial detention to a period of sixty
days, with one thirty-day continuance permitted upon the showing
of "good cause" by the prosecutor.3 5 After the expiration of ninety
days, the defendant would have to be tried or released on bond,
with appropriate conditions.3a 6
This change would permit the Government to seek and obtain
the pretrial detention of a defendant who was deemed dangerous and
likely to flee. It would, however, strictly curtail the length of time
the defendant could be incarcerated pending his trial. It would place
the onus on the Government to ensure that the case moved to trial
expeditiously.30 7 It would eliminate the disparate treatment of defen-
dants who are charged with federal crimes and whose pretrial status
depends not only on which test the courts use to determine if there
was a denial of the defendants' due process rights but the interpre-
tation of that test as well.3 08 It would eliminate the need for the
defendants to speculate as to the appropriate time to move for release
from pretrial custody and would obviate the need for the defendants
to bring this issue to the courts' attention regularly.3 °9 It would force
the Government to have its case well organized before it filed an
indictment.3 10 Because in passing the Bail Reform Act Congress
envisioned that, in most cases, pretrial detention would not last
longer than ninety days,3 ' such a provision would serve to ensure
that this expectation was realized.
It is true that such an amendment would eliminate the flexibility
the courts prefer to exercise in this matter. It would establish a rigid
timetable for the trial of detained defendants. It would not permit
the courts to decide the issue of due process in each case on its own
facts. It would place a significant burden on the Government to
304. See, e.g., D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 23-1322(d)(1)-(4) (1989).
305. See, e.g., D.C. CODE ANN. § 23-1322(d)(4) (1989).
306. Id.
307. See supra note 296 and accompanying text. See also Eason, supra note 12,
at 1077.
308. See supra notes 275-82 and accompanying text.
309. See supra notes 268-69 and accompanying text. See also Eason, supra note
12, at 1078.
310. See supra note 296 and accompanying text.
311. See supra notes 95-108 and accompanying text.
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proceed to trial quickly if it sought to maintain the defendant in
custody pending trial. When one balances these concerns against the
due process rights of the presumptively innocent defendant who has
spent ninety days in custody and the fact that Congress envisioned
that pretrial detention would not last longer than ninety days,312 such
an amendment to the Act prevails. It would effectively resolve the
problem of protracted periods of detention which defendants cur-
rently endure, yet it would still permit pretrial detention for up to
ninety days in those cases where it was warranted. It would eliminate,
however, both the arbitrary approach that the courts use to decide
this issue and the substantial expenditure of resources the current
system demands.
If Congress is serious about limiting pretrial detention to ninety
days in most cases and if it finds that an amendment as described
above is too far-reaching, then, at a minimum, it should adopt a
compromise solution. The alternative amendment would read as
follows:
A detained defendant shall be entitled to a review hearing upon
the expiration of ninety calendar days, unless the trial is in progress
or the trial has been delayed at the request of the defendant, other
than by the filing of timely motions. At that review hearing the
court shall determine whether the pretrial detention of the defendant
shall continue for a maximum period of sixty additional calendar
days. At this hearing, the presumption shall be in favor of release
on conditions pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 3142. The Government shall
bear the burden of proving that continued pretrial detention is
regulatory and not punitive. In determining whether the extended
detention would be regulatory and not punitive, the court shall
consider the following factors:
(1) the stage of the proceedings of this case;
(2) the date of the trial if one has been set;
(3) if a trial date has not been set, the reasons why no trial
date has been set;
(4) in view of defendant's pretrial detention of ninety days, any
alternatives to pretrial detention that would reasonably as-
sure against the possibility of the defendant's flight or
danger to the community which his release on conditions
may present.
If after the review hearing, the court determines that pretrial deten-
tion is still regulatory and necessary, the court may extend the
period of pretrial detention for up to sixty additional calendar days.
Upon the expiration of one hundred and fifty calendar days, unless
the trial is in progress or the trial has been delayed at the request
of the defendant, other than by the filing of timely motions, the
court shall hold a hearing to set conditions and to order the
defendant released pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3142(c).
312. See supra notes 95-108 and accompanying text.
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Because Congress anticipated that pretrial detention would not
last longer than ninety days, it should amend the Act to require that,
at a minimum, after ninety calendar days of pretrial detention, the
court must hold a hearing to determine whether the detention has
become punitive rather than regulatory." 3 Where the defendant has
already spent ninety days in custody, the presumption at the review
hearing should be that detention was punitive. The burden should
be on the prosecution to establish that pretrial detention is still
regulatory and must continue, rather than on the defendant to prove
that it is punitive in violation of due process.31 4
In order to promote consistency, Congress must delineate the
factors that the courts are to use at this hearing to determine whether
detention should continue. Because at the initial detention hearing
the court has already assessed the nature of the charges, the weight
of the evidence, the history and characteristics of the defendant, the
risk of flight, and the danger to the community that this defendant
poses, it would be redundant to re-evaluate all of these factors at
the review hearing. At this hearing the court should focus on the
major concern in this due process issue: the length of the detention
that has already occurred and the likely length of any future deten-
tion. "'5 It should also consider the fact that the defendant has already
spent ninety days in custody and whether at this point there are any
available alternatives31 6 that would "reasonably assure"3 7 against the
313. See, eg., United States v. Accetturo, 783 F.2d 382, 396 (3d Cir. 1986)
(Sloviter, J., dissenting).
314. See, e.g., United States v. Mendoza, 663 F. Supp. 1043, 1047 (D.N.J. 1987).
See also Miller & Guggenheim, supra note 274, at 412-13.
315. See United States v. Colombo, 616 F. Supp. 780, 785-6 (E.D.N.Y.) rev'd
777 F.2d 96 (2d Cir. 1985). See also Applbaum, supra note 95, at 1089; Himsell, supra
note 12, at 464.
316. A number of courts have begun to devise creative alternatives to pretrial
detention. See, e.g., United States v. Patriarca, 948 F.2d 789, 793 (1st Cir. 1991). In
Patriarca the First Circuit upheld the lower court's order to release the defendant with
the standard conditions set forth in the statute, as well as the following more innovative
conditions: that the defendant remain in his home, twenty-four hours per day (save
for medical appointments or meetings with his attorney while wearing an electronic
monitoring device; that he meet or communicate only with his attorneys and individuals
approved by the court; that he keep a record of any such communications; that at his
own expense, he install and maintain 24-hour video camera surveillance of each entry
to his home; that he maintain only one telephone and telephone line at his home; that
he execute an agreement to forfeit four million dollars, collateralized by property, if
the court determines that he has violated a condition of his release; and that he be
subjected to unannounced searches by law enforcement officers.
In United States v. DiGiacomo, the district court ordered release of the defendants
subject to the following conditions: house arrest subject to electronic monitoring; a
limitation on meetings or communications with only their attorneys, certain relatives
and a small number of close friends, all of which would be monitored by the installation
of a pen-register on the defendants' telephones to record the destination of outgoing
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defendant's flight or danger to the community if released on condi-
tions pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3142.
In order not to penalize the defendant for exercising his right to
file motions to litigate legal issues, either proposed amendment must
also contain a provision, like the District of Columbia Bail Reform
legislation, which specifically prohibits the court from extending the
period of pretrial detention due to the filing of motions by the
defendant.318 The second amendment should also contain a provision
calls, and the possible tracing of incoming calls, in addition to the maintenance of a
log by the defendants to record their communications which would be available to the
Government for review; a restriction on communication with codefendants, except in
the presence of their attorneys; and the posting of their assets which would be subject
to forfeiture if they failed to appear as required. United States v. DiGiacomo, 746 F.
Supp. 1176, 1189-90 (D. Mass. 1990). See also United States v. O'Brien, 895 F.2d 810,
811 (1st Cir. 1990); United States v. Traitz, 807 F.2d 322, 323-24 (3d Cir. 1986). But
for a rejection of such conditions see United States v. Tortora, 922 F.2d 880, 882 (1st
Cir. 1990); United States v. Gotti, 776 F. Supp. 666, 672-73 (E.D.N.Y. 1991); and
United States v. Infelise, 765 F. Supp. 960, 964 (N.D. Ill. 1991), where the courts
refused to permit the use of electronic surveillance equipment and other stringent
conditions as an alternative to pretrial detention.
317. See 18 U.S.C. § 3142(f) (1988). Under section 3142(f) of the Bail Reform
Act, the Government must prove that no combination of conditions will reasonably
assure the appearance of the defendant, the safety of any person, or the safety of the
community. Id. (emphasis added). As one court recently observed: "Congress did,
however, choose to use the term 'danger,' which by its nature is a risk concept. By
using this term, Congress did not declare that the community is entitled to assurances
of freedom from all harm, and a court cannot detain arrestees on the mere apprehension
of danger of harm. Rather, the court's inquiry must focus on whether by conditions
of release the community can reasonably be assured of its safety." United States v.
Phillips, 732 F. Supp. 255, 266 (D. Mass. 1990) (citations omitted). The need for the
reasonableness of this assurance is even more acute after the defendant has already
spent ninety days in custody awaiting his trial.
318. D.C. CODE ANN. § 23-1322(d)(2)(A) (1989). See also supra notes 283-88 and
accompanying text. If such a provision is contained in the amendment, there may be
a concern that a defendant may file frivolous pretrial motions merely to delay the trial.
Once the 90 or 150 days had passed, the defendant would be entitled to release on
conditions. Arguably, the defendant would then be able to flee from the jurisdiction
or endanger the community. It would, however, constitute unethical behavior for a
lawyer to file frivolous motions merely to delay the proceedings. See MODEL CODE OF
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-102(A)(2) (1983). The Model Code of Professional
Responsibility states that 'a lawyer shall not "knowingly advance a claim or defense
that is unwarranted under existing law." Id. Under the Model Rules of Professional
Conduct, a "lawyer shall not bring or defend a proceeding, or assert or controvert an
issue therein, unless there is a basis for doing so that is not frivolous, which includes
a good faith argument for an extension, modification or reversal of existing law ......
MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT, Rule 3.1 (1990). In addition, an attorney
who files motions merely for dilatory purposes may be monetarily sanctioned by the
court for his actions. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1927, an attorney "who so multiplies
the proceedings in any case unreasonably and vexatiously may be required by the court
to satisfy personally the excess costs, expenses and attorneys' fees reasonably incurred
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that if, at the ninety-day mark, the court found that pretrial detention
was still regulatory and must continue, then another hearing should
be held in sixty days, unless the trial had already begun by that point
or the defendant had requested the delay. At the second hearing, if
the trial had not yet begun after one hundred and fifty days of pretrial
custody, then the court would set appropriate conditions and order
the release of the defendant.
Such an amendment of the Bail Reform Act would serve many of
the same functions as the first recommended amendment. It would
not, however, strictly limit pretrial detention to a period of ninety
days, and would permit longer detention in those extraordinary cases
where it was warranted. Ultimately, however, it would restrict the
length of pretrial detention to a period of 150 days, 1 9 with a pre-
sumption that after ninety days the detention has become punitive
rather than regulatory.
By establishing, this presumption and shifting the burden to the
Government to prove at a review hearing that detention was still
regulatory and necessary, Congress would prescribe that periods of
pretrial detention of longer than ninety days are to be considered
exceptional. It would legislate that such pretrial detention could only
be extended when the Government could show that it is not responsible
for the delay, the trial is imminent, and there are still no alternatives
that could reasonably assure against the risk of flight or possible
danger to the community. By statutorily scheduling review hearings,
it would also eliminate the need for the defendant to speculate as to
whether his pretrial detention was ripe for consideration of a due
process violation and would eliminate the need to regularly bring the
issue to the court's attention. 20 This amendment would also compel
the prosecution to prepare its case promptly and adopt every possible
because of such conduct." 28 U.S.C. § 1927 (1992) (emphasis added).
For example, in United States v. Blodgett, the Ninth Circuit held that the lower
court had the power to impose a monetary sanction on a criminal defense attorney
who filed a frivolous appeal in bad faith, solely for the purposes of delay. United
States v. Blodgett, 709 F.2d 608, 609 (9th Cir. 1983). The Court remanded the case
for a hearing to determine if the appeal in question was, in fact, filed solely to delay
the proceedings. Id. at 610. The court of appeals also noted that a district court has
the "inherent power to impose sanctions on counsel who 'willfully abuse[s] judicial
processes' by taking actions in bad faith, i.e. solely for the purposes of delay. Id. at
609 (quoting Roadway Express Inc. v. Piper, 447 U.S. 752, 766 (1980)). Of course, 28
U.S.C. § 1927 must be strictly construed "so that the legitimate zeal of an attorney in
representing her client is not dampened." Browning v. Kramer, 933 F.2d 340 (5th Cir.
1991) (citing Roadway Express Inc. v. Piper, 447 U.S. 752 (1980)).
319. See supra notes 95-108 and accompanying text. This period is sixty days
longer than Congress envisioned pretrial detention would last when passing the Bail
Reform Act. Id.
320. See supra notes 268-69 and accompanying text. See also Eason, supra note
12, at 1078.
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measure to ensure that a trial takes place expeditiously if it wishes to
have the defendant detained before trial . 2' Furthermore, it would
promote consistency by requiring that all courts use the same factors
to decide whether the period of pretrial detention had become punitive
rather than regulatory. The factors enumerated would focus on the
element of time-the amount of time that the defendant had already
spent in custody and the amount of time the defendant would likely
continue to be so held.3 2 In addition, the court would examine the
role the prosecution played in the delay of trial, and in view of the
period of detention which had already taken place, whether any other
alternatives to pretrial detention were reasonable and available at that
time*323 These factors also reflect Congress' position that pretrial
custody of longer than ninety days is to be considered exceptional.
Consequently, the defendant should be released unless the Government
can establish that the trial will be held in the near future, that it was
not responsible for the delay, and that after the defendant had already
spent ninety days in custody, there were still no alternatives that could
reasonably assure that this defendant would not flee or would not
pose a danger to the community.3M
These proposed changes also take into consideration the fact that
prisons are overcrowded and likely to remain so for the future.125 With
the advent of minimum mandatory sentences for numerous federal
offenses326 and life sentences for career offenders,3 27 the abolition of
parole,312 and the increased use of pretrial detention, 329 the prison
population in this country is exploding. The federal prison population
is expected to increase 119 percent from 1987 to 1997.330 The expense
321. See note 296 and accompanying text. See also, Eason, supra note 12 at
1077.
322. See supra note 315 and accompanying text.
323. See supra notes 316-17 and accompanying text.
324. See Miller & Guggenheim, supra note 274, at 412-13. Some commentators
have suggested an even stricter time limit-the right to trial for a detained defendant
within fourteen to thirty days-and a strong set of escalating protections if the
Government seeks to extend the period of pretrial detention. Id.
325. MARC MAUER, AMERICANS BEBmN BARs: A COMPARISON OF INTERNATIONAL
RATES OF INCARCERATION 3 (1991). According to one study, the "United States has the
world's highest known rate of incarceration, with 426 prisoners per 100,000 population.
South Africa is second in the world with a rate of 333 per 1000,000 and the Soviet
Union third with 268 per 100,000 population." Id.
326. See, e.g., 21 U.S.C. § 848(a) (1988).
327. UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMMISSION, FEDERAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES
MANUAL § 4B1.1 (Nov. 1990) (Career Offender provisions).
328. 18 U.S.C. § 3141 (1988).
329. See supra notes 193-97 and accompanying text.
330. UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMMISSION, SUPPLEMENTARY REPORT IN THE
INITIAL SENTENCING GUEDELIS AND POLICY STATEMENTS, 71 (June 18, 1987) (cited in
MAUER, supra note 325, at 8).
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of incarcerating these individuals is exorbitant."' As the following
chart indicates,3 2 the cost of incarcerating defendants from the time
of their arrest to the adjudication333 of their cases has risen dramati-
cally. In just a two-year period, the cost has soared approximately
one hundred and fifty-seven percent.1 4 Over two- thirds of the total
expenditure goes to pay for the detention of defendants from the time
of their initial hearing to the adjudication of their case.335
COST OF FEDERAL DETENTION
Pretrial Services Total From Pre-initial Hearing Post lnitial Hearing
Agency (PSA) To Post Adjudication to Adjudication
Cases aloetd"
Date Cost % Increase From Cost Pre Cost % of Tot.
Previow Year Initial Hearing
July I, 1987 21,952 $27,729,277 N/A $940,480 $19,343,704 700
to
June 30, 1988-
July I, 1988 30,139 $54,678,322 97% $1,939,115 S37,175,616 68%
to
June 30, 1989T
July 1, 1989 38,797 $90,994,844 600o $3,246,812 $57,642,710 63%
to
June 30, 1990
In order to alleviate this substantial economic cost, as well as
address the significant social cost of incarcerating presumptively
331. "The total cost of incarcerating the more than one million Americans in
prisons and jails is now $16 billion a year." MAUER, supra note 325, at 3 (citing
Justice Expenditure and Employment, 1988 Bureau of Justice Statistics (July 1990)).
332. These figures are not complete because the Administrative Office of the
United States Courts does not maintain statistics on the total cost of incarcerating all
defendants in federal facilities. These figures only reflect the cost of incarceration for
those cases that the Pretrial -Services Agency has maintained files.
333. In this context, adjudication is defined as the determination of guilt or
innocence.
334. It appears that Congress also severely underestimated the increased cost of
detaining defendants pretrial. In a letter dated May 24, 1983 from Alice M. Rivlin,
the Director of the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) to Senator Strom Thurmond,
the Chairman of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, Ms. Rivlin estimated that the
increased cost to the federal government for detaining defendants pretrial would be
about $1.1 million in fiscal year 1983, $4.6 million by fiscal year 1984 and $5.6 million
by fiscal year 1988. Letter from Alice M. Rivlin, Director of the Congressional Budget
Office, to Strom Thurmond, Chairman of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, in
Report of the Committee on the Judiciary, United States Senate on S. 215, S. REP.
No. 147, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 66 (1983).
335. This amount includes the cost of incarcerating those who are either ordered
detained by the court or who can not meet the release conditions set by the court.
336. All figures on this table pertain only to Pretrial Services Agency (PSA) cases
closed during the time indicated.
337. 1988 ANNUAL REPORT at 47, 398 (all information for time period of 7-1-87
to 6-30-88).
338. 1989 ANNUAL REPORT at 40, 396 (all information for time period of 7-1-88
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innocent individuals for protracted periods of time the Bail Reform
Act must be modified to include one of the proposed amendments
set forth above. These proposed changes would still provide the
Government with the option of detaining potentially dangerous or
fleeing defendants, but would restrict the length of that detention
and would more effectively address the due process rights of those
defendants who find themselves detained for protracted periods of
time.
CONCLUSION
When Congress passed the Bail Reform Act of 1984, it mistakenly
relied on the Speedy Trial Act to limit the duration of pretrial
detention. Pursuant to the Bail Reform Act of 1984, large numbers
of individuals are being incarcerated pending their trials. Periods of
pretrial confinement often exceed the ninety days contemplated by
Congress. In some cases, the duration of such detention is even
three, four or five times as long as Congress intended when it passed
this law. There is no uniformity in the factors the courts use to
determine whether the period of pretrial detention exceeds constitu-
tional limits and no consistency in the manner in which the courts
apply these factors. In order to eliminate this arbitrariness and
conform to Congress' original intent regarding the length of pretrial
detention, the Bail Reform Act of 1984 must be revised to include
provisions strictly limiting the duration of pretrial confinement to a
period of ninety days and requiring that if this limit must be extended
for a period of sixty days, then the Government will bear a heavy
burden to establish that this extension should be granted. Only in
this way will the due process rights of the presumptively innocent
defendant be protected while still permitting the use of pretrial
detention to safeguard against the potential risk of flight or danger
to the community the released defendant may present.
338. 1989 ANNuAL REPORT at 40, 396 (all information for time period of 7-1-88
to 6-30-89).
339. 1990 ANNUAL REPORT at 259 (all information for time period of 7-1-89 to
6-30-90) (The percentages for this time period were computed by this author.).
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